Bruce Livesey is a former researcher for the investigative programmes on CBC, the national state funded broadcaster. His book represents another addition to the history of securities regulation in Canada such as the extensively researched and documented books by Christopher Armstrong of the University of Toronto in his 2 tomes covering the period from 1870-1940 (Blue Skies and Boiler Rooms) and 1940 until 1980 (Moose Pastures and Mergers). The period from 1980 until the present has not yet been extensively researched and documented in one place in a similar thorough fashion. Indeed Mr. Livesey’s book, along with others of a similar vein (see “Swindlers: Cons & Cheats and how to Protect Your Investments from Them” by Al Rosen & Mark Rosen, 2010, published by Madison Press Books, Toronto, Canada.) provide vignettes of the constant churn of scams, scandals and screw-ups that securities regulation in Canada has consistently failed to remediate. These cases of investor pillaging continue to provide substantial fodder for drawing derisive comments from foreign regulators and the International investment community about how inadequate investor protection is in Canada. An attentive reader of the national Canadian business press would probably be aware of most of the stories in Mr. Livesey’s book as he covers much of the same ground that others have tread over in recent years, e.g. Nortel, Atlas Storage, ABCP, Norshield, near-Banks, mutual fund fees, Earl Jones and crooked financial advisors. There are some insights and tips that astute investors have seen before, e.g., read the notes to the financial statements before investing! He also laments and expresses rage at the inability and lack of determination to investigate and prosecute the crooks in Canada by the police and the provincial securities regulators. One egregious example he reviews is Conrad Black’s removal of documents from his Toronto office despite a court order in Canada of which Mr. Black was convicted in the USA. Mr. Black was not charged in Canada over the Hollinger affair. However Mr. Livesey’s characterization of fractional banking and income trusts as quasi Ponzi schemes is a bit much. It stretches credibility and is an analogy taken too far and without adequate analysis I would argue. The income trusts had their tax rates changed which put them on to an equal tax footing with dividend paying corporation. Many trusts with suitable business models congruent with the structure of income trusts have continued to operate as income trusts. Fractional lending operations of the Banks are regulated and although by their nature, banking financial statements are opaque at best, they are still published and audited by firms that can be sued, and supervised by a federal regulator. But still scams and scandals happen. Regulation and oversight of the Canadian Chartered Bank’s near-banking operations still comes under the purview of the federal and provincial regulators and the Minister of Finance. Even there when problems occur, the authorities have acted as in the ABCP case. Federal law required the bankers to treat all investors equally. The fact that they paid off the small ones (holding less than $1 million of ABCP) to the tune of $187 million, the ones most at risk and had likely been misled by their financial advisors, represented a least-worst case solution to work out the situation and resolve the much larger $32 billion problem involving the Banks and other larger near-bank and corporate treasury functions (although it seems Barrick Gold got much of its $60 million back by using their clout with Minister of Finance in Ottawa). The scandal is that it seems the financial advisors who sold these small investors an inappropriate asset class could not be punished (sued) as per the terms of the settlement. Mr. Livesey’s prescription for fixing the current environment is to lament the failure of the National Securities Regulator with a proactive enforcement function. But he does not provide any analysis of previous attempts to establish a national securities regulator, and why it is unlikely such a regulator is likely to appear on the scene any time soon. As documented by others, such an analysis would explain the British North America Act and the power for regulating commerce that belong to the provinces, the two Supreme Courts cases reviewing legislation to establish one, a current federal government sympathetic to provincial rights, a separatist government in Quebec, and the interests of the legal/financial/regulatory elites in Toronto, Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver in ensuring a national regulator does not happen and they continue to exercise maximum discretion to avoid scrutiny and taxes payable. Finally there is scant little advice for the individual investor on what steps they can take to protect themselves in this snake pit.