A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation by Debraj RayA Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation by Debraj Ray

A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

byDebraj Ray

Hardcover | November 1, 2007

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The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawingupon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
Debraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matematica ...
Title:A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition FormationFormat:HardcoverDimensions:300 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.97 inPublished:November 1, 2007Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:019920795X

ISBN - 13:9780199207954


Table of Contents

Preface1. IntroductionPart 1 The Setting2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements3. Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-CooperationPart 2 The Bargaining Approach to Coalitions Formation4. Irreversible Commitments5. Irreversible Commitments: Symmetric Games6. Applications7. Irreversible Commitments: The General Case8. A Framework for Reversible Commitments9. Reversible Commitments, Characteristic Functions, and Efficiency10. Games with ExternalitiesPart 3 The Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation11. Blocking12. Binding Agreements13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time

Editorial Reviews

`The issues addressed lie at the heart of game theory, yet have received too little attention. One hopes that young scholars will use this superb monograph as a launching pad to explore the many important, fascinating and unresolved questions to which Ray directs our attention.'Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics