Agency and Joint Attention

Hardcover | September 9, 2013

EditorJanet Metcalfe, Betsy Sparrow, Herbert S. Terrace

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Human infants do not seem to be born with concepts of self or joint attention. One basic goal of Agency and Joint Attention is to unravel how these abilities originate. One approach that has received a lot of recent attention is social. Some argue that by virtue of an infant's intense eye gazewith her mother, she is able, by the age of four months, to establish a relationship with her mother that differentiates between "me" and "you." At about twelve months, the infant acquires the non-verbal ability to share attention with her mother or other caregivers. Although the concepts of selfand joint attention are nonverbal and uniquely human, the question remains, how do we establish metacognitive control of these abilities? A tangential question is whether nonhuman animals develop abilities that are analogous to self and joint attention. Much of this volume is devoted to the development of metacognition of self and joint attention in experiments on the origin of consciousness, knowing oneself, social referencing, joint action, the neurological basis of joint attention, the role of joint action, mirror neurons, phenomenology, andcues for agency.

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Human infants do not seem to be born with concepts of self or joint attention. One basic goal of Agency and Joint Attention is to unravel how these abilities originate. One approach that has received a lot of recent attention is social. Some argue that by virtue of an infant's intense eye gazewith her mother, she is able, by the age of...

Janet Metcalfe is Professor in the Department of Psychology at Columbia University. Betsy Sparrow is Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at Columbia University. Herbert S. Terrace is Professor in the Department of Psychology at Columbia University.

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:384 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:September 9, 2013Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:019998834X

ISBN - 13:9780199988341

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Table of Contents

ContributorsHerbert Terrace: Introduction1. Herbert S. Terrace: Becoming Human: Why Two Minds are Better Than One2. Malinda Carpenter and Josep Call: How Joint Is The Joint Attention Of Apes And Human Infants?3. Derek C. Penn and Daniel J. Povinelli: The Comparative Delusion: The 'Behavioristic'/ 'Mentalistic' Dichotomy in Comparative Theory Of Mind Research4. Logan Fletcher and Peter Carruthers: Behavior-Reading Versus Mentalizing In Animals5. Beatrice Beebe, Sara Markese, Lorraine Bahrick, Frank Lachmann, Karen Buck, Henian Chen, Patricia Cohen, Howard Andrews, and Joseph Jaffe: On Knowing and Being Known in the 4-Month Origins of Disorganized Attachment: An Emerging Presymbolic Theory Of Mind6. Andrew N. Meltzoff and Rechele Brooks: Gaze Following And Agency In Human Infancy7. Gyorgy Gergely: Ostensive Communication and Cultural Learning: The Natural Pedagogy Hypothesis8. Fabia Franco: Embodied Attention in Infant Pointing9. Athena Vouloumanos and Kristine H. Onishi: Understanding the Structure of Communicative Interactions in Infancy10. Vittorio Gallese and Corrado Sinigaglia: Cognition in Action: A New Look at the Cortical Motor System11. Stefanie Hoehl: Early Sensitivity to Emotion Cues - Precursors of Social Referencing?12. Anne Bockler and Natalie Sebanz: Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action13. Elizabeth Redcay and Rebecca Saxe: Do You See What I See? The Neural Bases of Joint Attention14. Janet Metcalfe: 'Knowing' That the Self is the Agent15. Robrecht Van Der Wel and Gunther Knoblich: Cues To Agency: Time Can Tell16. Wolfgang Prinz, Christiane Diefenbach, and Anne Springer: The Meaning of Actions: Crosstalk between Procedural and Declarative Action Knowledge17. Ezequiel Morsella Tanaz Molapour, and Margaret T. Lynn: The Three Pillars of Volition: Phenomenal States, Ideomotor Processing, and The Skeletal Muscle System18. Sara Steele and Hakwan Lau: The Function of Consciousness in Controlling Behavior19. Elisabeth Pacherie: Sense of Agency: Many Facets, Multiple Sources