An Anticipative Feedback Solution For The Infinite-horizon, Linear-quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game

January 21, 2013|
An Anticipative Feedback Solution For The Infinite-horizon, Linear-quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game by U.s. Bureau Of Labor Statistics
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This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the infinite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilibrium position. The idea comes from Kydland (1977) who suggested deriving a consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game by varying the coefficients in the player's linear constant-coefficient decision rules. Here feedback is understood in the sense of setting a current control vector as a function of a predetermined state vector. The proposed solution is derived for discrete- and continuous-time games and is called the anticipative feedback solution. The solution is illustrated with a numerical example of a duopoly model
Title:An Anticipative Feedback Solution For The Infinite-horizon, Linear-quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg ...Format:PaperbackProduct dimensions:34 pages, 9.69 X 7.44 X 0.07 inShipping dimensions:34 pages, 9.69 X 7.44 X 0.07 inPublished:January 21, 2013Publisher:BiblioGovLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:1288632282

ISBN - 13:9781288632282

Appropriate for ages: All ages

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