An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Hardcover | June 15, 2015

byTilman Borgers

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What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Borgers addresses these questions and more through anexploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rulesof the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theoremon expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Borgers also provides anexamination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

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What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Borgers addresses these questions and more through anexploration of the economic theory of mechanism des...

Tilman Borgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan. Before coming to Michigan in 2005, he was Professor of Economics at University College London. He holds a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics. Daniel Krahmer is Full Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at U...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:264 pages, 9.41 × 6.3 × 0.91 inPublished:June 15, 2015Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:019973402X

ISBN - 13:9780199734023

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction2. Screening3. Bayesian Mechanism Design: Examples4. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: Examples5. Incentive Compatibility6. Bayesian Mechanism Design7. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms8. Non-Transferrable Utility9. Informational Interdependence10. Robust Mechanism Design11. Dynamic Mechanism Design

Editorial Reviews

"The first seven chapters of the book focus on the quasi-linear environments studied in most economic applications, with more general environments ('non-transferable utility') postponed to chapter 8. This ordering of material reflects not the historical development of the subject but a naturaland effective path to learn the material. Borgers develops a unified treatment of core material without attempting to be exhaustive. Valuable endnotes at the end of each chapter then explain the historical context and relation to the literature more broadly. It will serve as an excellent textbookfor graduate students and advanced undergraduates, and an invaluable reference for researchers." --Stephen Morris, Professor of Economics, Princeton University