Antitrust Economics

Hardcover | February 7, 2008

byRoger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, John W. Mayo

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This book provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that guides and motivates the design and enforcement of American antitrust laws. Along with a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues, economic theory is used to evaluate antitrust policy through theexamination of relevant legislation and landmark cases. Theory is discussed through its relation to policy issues, and in turn, the role of theory in the development of new policy is examined.

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This book provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that guides and motivates the design and enforcement of American antitrust laws. Along with a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues, economic theory is used to evaluate antitrust policy through theexamination of relevant legislation and lan...

Roger D. Blair is the Huber Hurst Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His teaching and research centers mainly on issues in antitrust economics. He has published several books and many articles in economics journals and law reviews. In addition, he has provided consulting services to the Department of Justice, the Fed...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:544 pages, 9.21 × 7.8 × 1.18 inPublished:February 7, 2008Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195135350

ISBN - 13:9780195135350

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Extra Content

Table of Contents

1. Antitrust in a Market Economy1-1 Introduction1-2 Virtues of Competitive Markets1-2-1 The Invisible Hand1-2-2 Efficiency Properties1-3 The Monopoly Problem and Antitrust Response1-4 A Cautionary Note on Intervention1-5 Antitrust Policy in the "New Economy"2. The Case for Competition2-1 Conditions Conducive to Competition2-2 The Competitive Firm: Profit Maximization2-3 A Competitive Firm's Short-Run Supply Curve2-4 Competitive Industry Supply in the Short Run2-5 Long-Run Profit Maximization2-6 Competitive Industry Equilibrium: Long Run2-7 Social Optimality of Competition2-8 A Noneconomic Argument for Competition3. The Case Against Monopoly3-1 Introduction3-2 Demand and Marginal Revenue Under Monopoly3-3 Short-Run Monopoly Profit Maximization3-4 Long-Run Monopoly Profit Maximization3-5 Monopoly Profit and Entry3-6 Welfare Effects of Monopoly3-7 The Dominant Firm3-8 Monopoly and Innovation3-9 Summary4. Antitrust Response to Monopoly4-1 Historical Background of Antitrust4-2 The Sherman Antitrust Act4-3 Legislative Intent of the Sherman Act4-4 Early Enforcement of the Sherman Act4-5 The Clayton Act4-6 The Federal Trade Commission Act4-7 Public Enforcement4-8 Antitrust Exemptions5. Private Enforcement5-1 Introduction5-2 Antitrust Standing5-3 Damages5-4 Class Actions and Parens Patriae5-5 Attorney's Fees5-6 Settlements of Private Antitrust Suits6. Antitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market Power6-1 Market Definition: General Principles6-2 Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines Criteria6-3 Market Definition: Evidence and Modern Approaches6-4 The Economics of Monopoly Power6-5 Relationship Between Market Definition and the Structural Determination of Market Power6-6 Monopoly Power in Practice6-7 Evaluating Entry and Expansion Barriers7. The Law of Monopolization7-1 Section 2 and Structural Monopoly7-2 The Legal Development of Monopolization7-3 Summary Standard for Illegal Monopolization7-4 Recent Supreme Court Decisions7-5 United States v. Microsoft Corporation7-6 Attempts to Monopolize7-7 Conspiracies to Monopolize7-8 Antitrust Injury and Damages8. Exclusionary Practices8-1 Introduction8-2 The Economics of Predatory Pricing8-3 Empirical Evidence of Predatory Pricing8-4 Alternative Rules Against Predatory Pricing8-5 Predatory Pricing Cases8-6 Economic Feasibility of Recoupment8-7 Raising Rivals' Costs8-8 Bundled Discounts8-9 Essential Facility Doctrine8-10 The Trinko Decision9. Collusion: Horizontal Price Fixing9-1 Cartel Theory9-2 The Problem of Entry9-3 The Problem of Cheating9-4 The Problem of Unequal Costs9-5 Partial Conspiracies9-6 Empirical Evidence9-7 Judicial Treatment of Price Fixing9-8 Applications of the Per Se Rule9-9 Economic Effects of Enforcement9-10 Summary10. Alternative Forms of Horizontal Collusion10-1 Economic Analysis of Market Division10-2 Judicial Treatment of Market Division10-3 Boycotts: An Economic Analysis10-4 Judicial Treatment of Boycotts10-5 Some Economic Aspects of Information10-6 Judicial Treatment of Data Dissemination11. Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion11-1 Some Simple Oligopoly Models11-2 The Antitrust Enforcement Dilemma11-3 Practices That Facilitate Tacit Collusion11-4 Case Development11-5 Summary Remarks12. Horizontal Mergers12-1 Introduction12-2 The Essence of Horizontal Mergers12-3 Merger Activity12-4 Incentives to Merge12-5 The Economic Foundations of Horizontal Merger Policy: Theory12-6 The Economic Foundations of Horizontal Merger Policy: Evidence12-7 Merger Policy12-8 Conclusion13. Price Discrimination13-1 The Economics of Price Discrimination13-2 The Law Concerning Price Discrimination13-3 Summary14. The Theory of Vertical Integration14-1 Introduction14-2 Vertical Integration with Competitive Markets14-3 Monopoly and Vertical Integration14-4 Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure14-5 Summary and Conclusions15. Vertical Merger Policy15-1 Introduction15-2 Early Sherman Act Enforcement15-3 The Clayton Act Is Brought to Bear15-4 The Chicago School Prevails15-5 Foreclosure Redux15-6 Conclusion16. Maximum Resale Price Fixing16-1 Introduction16-2 Fixing Maximum Resale Prices: Economics16-3 Other Economically Equivalent Strategies16-4 The Albrecht Rule16-5 Albrecht Overruled by Khan16-6 Conclusion17. Resale Price Maintenance17-1 Introduction17-2 The Economics of RPM17-3 RPM: Judicial Analysis17-4 Antitrust Injury and Damages17-5 Some Final Thoughts18. Tying Arrangements18-1 Economic Analysis of Tying18-2 Judicial Treatment of Tying18-3 Public Policy Towards Tying19. Reciprocity19-1 Introduction19-2 Motivation for Reciprocity19-3 Conditions Conducive to Reciprocity19-4 Empirical Research on Reciprocity19-5 Economic Impact of Reciprocity19-6 Judicial Treatment of Reciprocity19-7 Concluding Comments20. Exclusive Dealing20-1 Introduction20-2 Economics of Exclusive Dealing20-3 The Legal Treatment of Exclusive Dealing20-4 Conclusion21. Territorial and Customer Restrictions21-1 Introduction21-2 Economic Incentives21-3 Empirical Evidence21-4 Legal Treatment of Vertical Territorial Restrictions21-5 Conclusion