Assurance: An Austinian view of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims by Krista LawlorAssurance: An Austinian view of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims by Krista Lawlor

Assurance: An Austinian view of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims

byKrista Lawlor

Hardcover | March 14, 2013

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Claiming to know is more than making a report about one's epistemic position: one also offers one's assurance to others. What is an assurance? In this book, Krista Lawlor unites J. L. Austin's insights about the pragmatics of assurance-giving and the semantics of knowledge claims into asystematic whole. The central theme in the Austinian view is that of reasonableness: appeal to a "reasonable person" standard makes the practice of assurance-giving possible, and lets our knowledge claims be true despite differences in practical interests and disagreement among speakers and hearers.Lawlor provides an original account of how the Austinian view addresses a number of difficulties for contextualist semantic theories, resolves closure-based skeptical paradoxes, and helps us to tread the line between acknowledging our fallibility and skepticism.
Krista Lawlor received her Master's degree from Tufts University, and PhD from the University of Michigan. She is now Associate Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University, and the author of New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts (Garland Press, 2001).
Title:Assurance: An Austinian view of Knowledge and Knowledge ClaimsFormat:HardcoverDimensions:240 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 0 inPublished:March 14, 2013Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199657890

ISBN - 13:9780199657896

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Table of Contents

Preface1. The speech act of assurance2. Austinian semantics3. Austinian semantics and linguistic data4. Paradox, Probability, and Inductive Knowledge5. Idiosyncrasy, disagreement and the reasonable person standard6. Assurance and radical skepticismBibliographyIndex