Auction Theory

Other | April 1, 2002

byKrishna, Vijay, Vijay Krishna

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Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition,Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.

*The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions
*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information
*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory

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From the Publisher

Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auct...

Format:OtherDimensions:200 pages, 1 × 1 × 1 inPublished:April 1, 2002Publisher:Academic PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0080475965

ISBN - 13:9780080475967

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Table of Contents

Private Value Auctions; The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Qualifications and Extensions; Mechanism Design; Auctions with Interdependent Values; The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; Asymmetries and Other Complications; Efficiency and the English Auction; Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Bidding Rings; An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions; Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Some Revenue Considerations; Sequential Sales; Nonidentical Objects; Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Appendices: Continuous Distributions' Stochastic Orders; Order Statistics; Affiliated Random Variables; Some Linear Algebra; Games of Incomplete Information; Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions.