Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Hardcover | July 24, 2008

byNeil Feit

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Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the faceof beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in general, the contents of our beliefs are properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do notvary with time, place, or person. Belief about the Self offers a sustained defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with an array of new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to someimportant problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.

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Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the faceof beliefs about the self. These are beliefs...

Neil FeitAssociate Professor of Philosophy, SUNY Fredonia
Format:HardcoverDimensions:240 pages, 5.71 × 8.31 × 0.59 inPublished:July 24, 2008Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195341368

ISBN - 13:9780195341362

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Table of Contents

Introduction1. Mental Content and the Problem of De Se Belief2. In Favor of the Property Theory3. Alternatives to the Property Theory4. Arguments against the Property Theory5. The Property Theory and De Re Belief6. The Property Theory, Rationality, and Kripke's Puzzle about BeliefN 7The Property Theory, Twin Earth, and Belief about KindsReferencesIndex

Editorial Reviews

"Belief about the Self is an important contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, and useful for the broader field of cognitive science."--John Perry, Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University