Classics in Game Theory by Harold William KuhnClassics in Game Theory by Harold William Kuhn

Classics in Game Theory

EditorHarold William Kuhn

Paperback | February 6, 1997

Pricing and Purchase Info

$97.50

Earn 488 plum® points

Prices and offers may vary in store

Quantity:

In stock online

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores

about

Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume.

Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

Harold W. Kuhn is Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Economics at Princeton University and is internationally known for his joint paper with the late Albert W. Tucker that initiated the theory of "nonlinear programming." In 1994, on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Prizes, he organized and chaired a historic Nobel Seminar on ...
Loading
Title:Classics in Game TheoryFormat:PaperbackDimensions:328 pagesPublished:February 6, 1997Publisher:Princeton University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0691011923

ISBN - 13:9780691011929

Look for similar items by category:

Reviews

Table of Contents

Permissions

Foreword

An Appreciation

1 Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games 3

2 The Bargaining Problem 5

3 Non-Cooperative Games 14

4 An Iterative Method of Solving a Game 27

5 Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form 36

6 Extensive Games and the Problem and Information 46

7 A Value for n-Person Games 69

8 Stochastic Games 80

9 Recursive Games 87

10 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments 119

11 A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy 127

12 The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games 140

13 Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders 170

14 The Core of an n-Person Game 192

15 Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model 216

Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points 247

Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 268

16 The Big Match 289

17 On Market Games 296

18 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games 317

List of Contributors 355

Index 357




From Our Editors

A subfield of mathematics and economics, the theory of games simulates situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other to hypothesize a conclusion. The contributions collected here are "classics" from the groundbreaking era of research launched in the late 1940s. These 18 essays constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. An invaluable tool for researchers and students of the sciences

Editorial Reviews

"This volume assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field [of game theory]. . ."