Cognitive Phenomenology

Paperback | August 14, 2014

EditorTim Bayne, Michelle Montague

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It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology" - that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptualcharacter in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenologyis part of conscious perception and conscious emotion. Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns theexistence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, therelationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of thevery nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.

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It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology" - that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptualcharacter in some sense that needs to be precisely ...

Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008). Michelle Montague lecture...

other books by Tim Bayne

Format:PaperbackDimensions:388 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.01 inPublished:August 14, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198708033

ISBN - 13:9780198708032

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Table of Contents

Contents1. Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne: Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction2. Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet: The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology3. Terry Horgan: From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed4. Uriah Kriegel: Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content5. Joseph Levine: On The Phenomenology of Thought6. Michelle Montague: The Phenomenology of Particularity7. David Pitt: Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content8. Jesse Prinz: The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology9. William Robinson: A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology10. Christopher Shields: On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia11. Charles Siewert: Phenomenal Thought12. Maja Spener: Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology13. Galen Strawson: Cognitive Phenomenology: real life14. Michael Tye and Briggs Wright: Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?15. David Woodruff-Smith: Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking

Editorial Reviews

"an excellent collection of articles on an important debate in contemporary philosophy of mind." --Angela Mendelovici and David Bourget, Australasian Journal of Philosophy