Consciousness And The Prospects Of Physicalism by Derek PereboomConsciousness And The Prospects Of Physicalism by Derek Pereboom

Consciousness And The Prospects Of Physicalism

byDerek Pereboom

Hardcover | April 1, 2011

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In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspectiverepresentations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these properties might actually lack. The second response draws on the proposal that currentlyunknown fundamental intrinsic properties provide categorical bases for known physical properties and would also yield an account of consciousness. While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The book's third theme is a defense of a nonreductiveaccount of physicalism. The type of nonreductivism endorsed departs from others in that it rejects all token identity claims for psychological and microphysical entities. The deepest relation between the mental and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by thenotion of identity.
Derek Pereboom is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University.
Title:Consciousness And The Prospects Of PhysicalismFormat:HardcoverDimensions:240 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:April 1, 2011Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199764034

ISBN - 13:9780199764037


Table of Contents

AcknowledgmentsIntroduction1. The Knowledge Argument and Introspective Inaccuracy2. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap3. Conceivability Arguments and Qualitative Inaccuracy4. Qualitative Inaccuracy and Recent Challenges to Conceivability Arguments5. Russellian Monism I6. Russellian Monism II7. Robust Nonreductive Physicalism8. Mental Compositional PropertiesBibliographyIndex