Contingent Capital: Short-term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Governance in France and…

Hardcover | November 27, 2011

byMichel Goyer

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Corporate Governance has become a major topic of interest for both academics and policy-makers in recent years. The advent of major financial scandals in the early 2000s (Enron, WorldCom, Ahold, Parmalat) was followed by turmoil in the financial markets at the end of the decade. The increasedpower of finance was a common factor singled out in the development of these events - especially shareholder value oriented institutional investors - across advanced capitalist economies. Will the pressures of financial market globalization force companies to converge on a shareholder-based model ofcorporate governance? In Contingent Capital Michel Goyer highlights the importance of the institutional context in which companies are embedded, focusing on the divergence in the allocation of capital by shareholder-value oriented institutional investors in Europe's two largest non-liberal market economies: France andGermany. The major difference between these two economies is that France has proven to be twice as attractive to short-term, impatient shareholders with a short-term horizon as compared to Germany - a disparity that disappears for investors with a longer-term term horizon. These empirical findingshighlight the importance of providing a sophisticated differentiation between different categories of institutional investors in order to assess the impact associated with the greater prominence of finance. Goyer points to the importance of firm-level institutional arrangements in the process bywhich companies coordinate their activities as the key variable for understanding the investment allocation of impatient investors. The implication is that the governing of corporations is not about whether or not strategies of shareholder value are being adopted - but rather what types ofstrategies of shareholder value are being pursued.

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Corporate Governance has become a major topic of interest for both academics and policy-makers in recent years. The advent of major financial scandals in the early 2000s (Enron, WorldCom, Ahold, Parmalat) was followed by turmoil in the financial markets at the end of the decade. The increasedpower of finance was a common factor singled...

Michel Goyer is Associate Professor in the Industrial Relations and Organizational Behavior unit, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick. He holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT. He has published in the areas of comparative corporate governance, institutional theory, and diversity in advanced capitalist economies, and on ...
Format:HardcoverDimensions:200 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.01 inPublished:November 27, 2011Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199578087

ISBN - 13:9780199578085

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Table of Contents

1. The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective2. Short-term Capital Mobility in France and Germany: Differentiated Empirical Data3. Law and Economics and Capital Mobility across Advanced Capitalist Countries4. Complex Causation and Contextualized Capitalisms5. Coordination and Institutions: France and Germany Compared6. Conclusion: Insights from Capital Mobility in France and Germany