Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and the Limits of State Authority

Hardcover | October 29, 2014

byCarmen Pavel

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The question of how to constrain states that commit severe abuses against their own citizens is as persistent as it is vexing. States are imperfect political forms that in theory possess both a monopoly on coercive power and final jurisdictional authority over their territory. These twinelements of sovereignty and authority can be used by state leaders and political representatives in ways that stray significantly from the interests of citizens. In the most extreme cases, when citizens become inconvenient obstacles in the pursuit of the self-serving ambitions of their leaders,state power turns against them. Genocide, torture, displacement, and rape are often the means of choice by which the inconvenient are made to suffer or vanish. In Divided Sovereignty, Carmen Pavel explores new institutional solutions to this abiding problem. She argues that coercive international institutions can stop these abuses and act as an insurance scheme against the possibility of states failing to fulfill their most basic sovereignresponsibilities. She thus challenges the longstanding assumption that collective grants of authority from the citizens of a state should be made exclusively for institutions within the borders of that state. Despite worries that international institutions such as the International Criminal Courtcould undermine domestic democratic control, citizens can divide sovereign authority between state and international institutions consistent with their right of democratic self-governance. Pavel defends universal, principled limits on state authority based on jus cogens norms, a special category ofnorms in international law that prohibit violations of basic human rights. Against skeptics, she argues that many of the challenges of building an additional layer of institutions can be met if we pay attention to the conditions of institutional success, which require experimentation with differentinstitutional forms, limitations on the scope of authority for coercive international institutions, and an appreciation of the limits of existing knowledge on institutional design.Thoughtfully conceived and forcefully argued, Divided Sovereignty will challenge what we think we know about the relationship between international institutions and the pursuit of the fundamental requirements of justice.

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The question of how to constrain states that commit severe abuses against their own citizens is as persistent as it is vexing. States are imperfect political forms that in theory possess both a monopoly on coercive power and final jurisdictional authority over their territory. These twinelements of sovereignty and authority can be used...

Carmen E. Pavel is a political theorist who specializes in contemporary political philosophy and the history of political thought. Her interests include liberal theory and contemporary challenges to it, ethics and public policy, international justice, the authority of international institutions, and environmental ethics. She is an Ass...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:240 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:October 29, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199376344

ISBN - 13:9780199376346

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Table of Contents

Introduction1. Why Divided Sovereignty?2. Method and Justification3. Outline of the Book1. Sovereignty, the Social Contract, and the Incompleteness of the State System1. The Institutions of the Social Contract2. On Sovereignty and Delegation of Authority3. Problems of Institutional Design4. Conceptual and practical Hurdles to Divided Sovereignty5. Conclusion2. Divided Sovereignty: the Principal-Agent Model1. Sovereignty Limiting Norms and their Current Effects2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal-Agent Model2.1 The Origins of the Model2.2 The Principle-Agent Model for International Institutions2.3 Delegation2.4 The Role of Consent3. Agency Costs at the International Level4. Why Use Principal-Agent Theory?5. Conclusion3. Domestic and International Implications: Slavery, Genocide and Civil War1. The Scope and Limits of International Authority2. Constitutional Interpretation and Change3. Slavery4. Genocide5. Civil Wars and Failed States6. Conclusion4. Theories and Institutional Facts1. One Step Theorizing: Cosmopolitan Justice2. Two Step Theorizing: The Case of Humanitarian Intervention3. Objections4. Conclusion5. Romanticizing Institutions1. Cosmopolitan Global Democracy2. Rule of Law Experiments3. Rule of Law for Global Democracy4. Institutional Assumptions and Bureaucratic Pathologies5. Conclusion6. Institutional Pluralism1. Institutions in International Criminal Law2. Fragmentation and Conflict3. The Benefits of a Pluralist System4. Complex Social Orders5. A Hobbesian Challenge6. Conclusion7. The Possibility of Rule-Governed Behavior in International Politics1. Cooperation under Anarchy2. Assumptions and Implications of International Relations Theorizing3. Self-Preservation as the Dominant State Preference4. The Possibility of a Rule-Governed OrderConclusion

Editorial Reviews

"Divided Sovereignty makes a compelling case for supplementing sovereign states with coercive international institutions. Though it shares a concern for global justice, the book presents a powerful alternative to the institutional visions typically outlined by cosmopolitans. By prioritizinggood institutional design over abstract morality, and defending the importance of collective self-determination, Pavel reorients recent debates. This is an original and important book." --Anna Stilz, Princeton University