Does Perception Have Content? by Berit BrogaardDoes Perception Have Content? by Berit Brogaard

Does Perception Have Content?

EditorBerit Brogaard

Hardcover | September 10, 2014

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Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of perception, the question of whether perception has content in the first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have questioned this claim. The issueimmediately raises a number of related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments? Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracyconditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address these and other central questions in the philosophy of perception.
Berit Brogaard is Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, St. Louis. She is the author of Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions and numerous articles in the philosophy of perception and philosophy of language.
Title:Does Perception Have Content?Format:HardcoverDimensions:416 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:September 10, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199756015

ISBN - 13:9780199756018

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Table of Contents

1. Berit Brogaard: Introduction: Does Perception Have Content?Part I: Content Views2. Bence Nanay: Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism3. Susanna Siegel: Affordances and the Contents of Perception4. Kathrin Gler: Looks, Reasons and ExperiencesPart II: Against Strong Content5. Charles Travis: The Preserve of Thinkers6. Diana Raffman: Disjunctivism and the Alleged Nontransitivity of IndiscriminabilityPart III: Reconciliatory Views7. Susanna Schellenberg: The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience8. Heather Logue: Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation9. Benj Hellie: On which perceptual phenomena have content and why they have itPart IV: Imagistic and Possible-Word Content10. Mohan Matthen: Image Content11. Michael Tye: What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?Part V: The Constituents of Perceptual Content and the Role of Perception12. Bill Lycan: What Does Vision Represent?13. Terry Horgan: Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color14. Tomasz Budek and Katalin Farkas: Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience