Epistemic Luck by Duncan PritchardEpistemic Luck by Duncan Pritchard

Epistemic Luck

byDuncan Pritchard

Paperback | October 11, 2007

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One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement.The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover,Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism;metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck. All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.
Duncan Pritchard is in the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling.
Title:Epistemic LuckFormat:PaperbackDimensions:304 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.69 inPublished:October 11, 2007Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199229783

ISBN - 13:9780199229789

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Table of Contents

IntroductionI. Scepticism1. Scepticism in contemporary debate2. Closure and context3. Neo-Mooreanism4. The source of scepticismII. Epistemic luck5. Luck6. Two varieties of epistemic luck7. Cognitive responsibility and the epistemic virtues8. Scepticism and epistemic luck9. Epistemic angstPostscript: Moral luck

Editorial Reviews

`Epistemologists commonly say that knowledge excludes luck. But few of us pause to explain what this common saying amounts to, or what truth it contains. Pritchard has paused to do just that, and the result is this fascinating and :qjoyable book. In attempting to explain the sense in whichknowledge excludes luck, Pritchard both offers a clear and comprehensive survey of much contemporary literature in the theory of knowledge, and also advances the dialectic considerably. If you work n the theory of knowledge, you cannot afford to ignore this book.' Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill