Epistemological Disjunctivism by Duncan PritchardEpistemological Disjunctivism by Duncan Pritchard

Epistemological Disjunctivism

byDuncan Pritchard

Paperback | October 29, 2014

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Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to theagent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses aradical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were availableon account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.
Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this field, including the books Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with A. Haddock and A. Millar, Oxford University Press, 2010). He is ed...
Title:Epistemological DisjunctivismFormat:PaperbackDimensions:182 pagesPublished:October 29, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198708963

ISBN - 13:9780198708964

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Table of Contents

AcknowledgementsIntroductionPart One: Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline1. Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass2. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism3. Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism4. Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism5. Seeing That P and Knowing That P6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction7. Resolving the Access ProblemNotes to Part OnePart Two: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic SupportIntroductory Remarks1. The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge2. Relevant Alternatives and Closure3. Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission and Favouring4. Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support5. Diagnosis6. A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory7. Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological DisjunctivismNotes to Part TwoPart Three: Radical ScepticismIntroductory Remarks1. Radical Scepticism2. Mooreanism3. Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism4. A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism5. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism6. Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies7. Radical Scepticism and Quietism8. Knowing and Saying That One Knows9. Concluding RemarksNotes to Part ThreeBibliographyIndex

Editorial Reviews

"This is a fascinating and first-rate contribution to an important topic. It is clearly written, covers the ground in a thorough and balanced way, and deals masterfully with the pertinent literature ... a terrific book" --Sven Bernecker, University of California, Irvine