Fictionalism In Metaphysics by Mark Eli KalderonFictionalism In Metaphysics by Mark Eli Kalderon

Fictionalism In Metaphysics

EditorMark Eli Kalderon

Paperback | July 7, 2005

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Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. It came to prominence in philosophy in 1980, when Hartry Field argued that mathematics does not have to be true to be good, and Bas van Fraassen argued that the aim of science is not truth but empiricaladequacy. Both suggested that the acceptance of a mathematical or scientific theory need not involve belief in its content. Thus the distinctive commitment of fictionalism is that acceptance in a given domain of inquiry need not be truth-normed, and that the acceptance of a sentence from theassociated region of discourse need not involve belief in its content. In metaphysics fictionalism is now widely regarded as an option worthy of serious consideration. This volume represents a major benchmark in the debate: it brings together an impressive international team of contributors, whose essays (all but one of them appearing here for the first time) representthe state of the art in various areas of metaphysical controversy, relating to language, mathematics, modality, truth, belief, ontology, and morality.
Mark Eli Kalderon is at University College London.
Title:Fictionalism In MetaphysicsFormat:PaperbackDimensions:368 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.82 inPublished:July 7, 2005Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199282196

ISBN - 13:9780199282197

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Table of Contents

Introduction1. Gideon Rosen: Problems in the history of fictionalism2. Kendall Walton: Metaphor and prop oriented make-believe3. Stephen Yablo: The myth of seven4. Seahwa Kim: Modal fictionalism and analysis5. James A. Woodbridge: Truth as a pretence6. Frederick Kroon: Belief about nothing in particular7. Daniel Nolan: Fictionalist attitudes about fictional matters8. Cian Dorr: What we disagree about when we disagree about ontology9. Richard Joyce: Moral fictionalism10. David Lewis: Quasi-realism is fictionalism11. Simon Blackburn: Quasi-realism no fictionalism