Free Will and Luck by Alfred R. MeleFree Will and Luck by Alfred R. Mele

Free Will and Luck

byAlfred R. Mele

Paperback | August 12, 2008

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Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophicaldebate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other forreaders who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.
Alfred R. Mele is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University.
Title:Free Will and LuckFormat:PaperbackDimensions:240 pages, 5.51 × 8.11 × 0.71 inPublished:August 12, 2008Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195374398

ISBN - 13:9780195374391

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction2. Free Will and Neuroscience3. Libertarianism, Luck, and Control4. Frankfurt-style Cases, Luck, and Soft Libertarianism5. A Daring Soft Libertarian Response to Present Luck6. Compatibilism: Objections and Replies7. My Compatibilist Proposal: Objections and Replies8. ConclusionReferencesIndex

Editorial Reviews

"The book is well-written and meticulously argued, and positions are carefully defined and presented. Mele's writing is a model of analytical exposition. And as always, Mele is the master of the philosophical thought experiment, and manages to make convincing positions where others have fearedto tread (or indeed would have never thought it were possible to tread)." --Saul Smilansky, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews