From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I by Kirk LudwigFrom Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I by Kirk Ludwig

From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I

byKirk Ludwig

Hardcover | November 18, 2016

Pricing and Purchase Info


Earn 473 plum® points

Prices and offers may vary in store


Ships within 1-3 weeks

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores


Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action.Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention, expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and it requires no group agents per se. Shared intention is a matter of agents in a group each intending that they bring about some end in accordance with a shared plan. Thus their participatoryintentions (their we-intentions) differ from individual intentions not in their mode but in their content. Joint intentional action then is a matter of a group of individuals successfully executing a shared intention. The account does not reduce shared intention to aggregates of individualintentions. However, it argues that the content of we-intentions can be analyzed wholly in terms of concepts already at play in our understanding of individual intentional action. The account thus vindicates methodological individualism for plural agency. The account is contrasted with other majorpositions on shared intention and joint action, and defended against objections. This forms the foundation for a reductive account of the agency of mobs and institutions, expressed in grammatically singular action sentences about groups and their intentions, in a second volume.
Kirk Ludwig is a Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University, Bloomington. He taught at the University of Florida from 1990 to 2010 and was the Colonel Alan R. and Margaret G. Crow CLAS Term Professor from 2008 to 2010, when he joined Indiana University, Bloomington. He works primarily...
Title:From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action IFormat:HardcoverDimensions:320 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.03 inPublished:November 18, 2016Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198755627

ISBN - 13:9780198755623

Look for similar items by category:


Table of Contents

Preface1. The Problem of Collective AgencyPart I: Singular Action Sentences2. What is an Event?3. The Logical Form of Singular Action Sentences4. Action, Motivation, Explanation, and Intention5. Conditional Intentions6. What is it to be the agent of an event or state?7. The Content of I-intentions8. The Adverb 'Intentionally'Part I: Summary and ConclusionPart II: Plural Action Sentences9. Logical Form of Plural Action Sentences10. Extensions and Explanations11. Consequences, Collective Actions, Illustrative Cases12. What are Shared or Group Intentions?13. The Distinctive Content of We-Intentions14. Some Initial Objections and Replies15. Collective Intentional Behavior16. Relation to Other Accounts17. Does the Account Require More of Collective Action than is Reasonable?Part II: Summary18. ConclusionBibliographyIndex