Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology

Hardcover | April 30, 2016

EditorMichael Brownstein, Jennifer Saul

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There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. "Implicit bias" is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations aretypically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like "violent," "lazy," "nurturing," "assertive," "scientist," and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about members of these groups. Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit (or unconscious) bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology iscomprised of two sections: "The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat," and "Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality." The first section contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and "dual process" models of the mind; the role ofaffect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second section containschapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of genderstereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. This volume can be read independently of, or in conjunction with, a second volume of essays, Volume II: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics, which explores the themes of moral responsibility in implicit bias, structural injustice in society, and strategies for implicit attitudechange.

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There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. "Implicit bias" is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations aretypically thought to involve associations between so...

Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American ...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:336 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.1 inPublished:April 30, 2016Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:019871324X

ISBN - 13:9780198713241

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Table of Contents

Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul: IntroductionSection One: The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype ThreatKeith Frankish: 1.1 Playing Double: Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-ControlBryce Huebner: 1.2 Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral CognitionJules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman: 1.3 The Heterogeneity of Implicit BiasEdouard Machery: 1.4 DeFreuding Implicit AttitudesRon Mallon: 1.5 Stereotype Threat and PersonsSection Two: Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and RationalityLouise M. Antony: 2.1 Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish SkepticismAlex Madva: 2.2 Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit BiasStacey Goguen: 2.3 Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and RationalityCatherine E. Hundleby: 2.4 The Status Quo Fallacy: Implicit Bias and Fallacies of ArgumentationCarole J. Lee: 2.5 Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in ScienceLaura di Bella, Eleanor Miles and Jennifer Saul: 2.6 Philosophers explicitly associate philosophy with maleness: an examination of implicit and explicit gender stereotypes in philosophy