In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

Hardcover | June 13, 2010

byJon Williamson

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How strongly should you believe the various propositions that you can express?That is the key question facing Bayesian epistemology. Subjective Bayesians hold that it is largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the other hand, maintain that appropriate degrees of belief are largely (though not entirely)determined by the agent's evidence. This book states and defends a version of objective Bayesian epistemology. According to this version, objective Bayesianism is characterized by three norms: * Probability - degrees of belief should be probabilities* Calibration - they should be calibrated with evidence* Equivocation - they should otherwise equivocate between basic outcomesObjective Bayesianism has been challenged on a number of different fronts. For example, some claim it is poorly motivated, or fails to handle qualitative evidence, or yields counter-intuitive degrees of belief after updating, or suffers from a failure to learn from experience. It has also beenaccused of being computationally intractable, susceptible to paradox, language dependent, and of not being objective enough.Especially suitable for graduates or researchers in philosophy of science, foundations of statistics and artificial intelligence, the book argues that these criticisms can be met and that objective Bayesianism is a promising theory with an exciting agenda for further research.

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How strongly should you believe the various propositions that you can express?That is the key question facing Bayesian epistemology. Subjective Bayesians hold that it is largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the other hand, maintain that appropriate degrees of beli...

Jon Williamson is Professor of Reasoning, Inference and Scientific Method in the philosophy department at the University of Kent. He works on causality, probability, logic and applications of formal reasoning within science, mathematics and artificial intelligence. Jon currently heads the philosophy department and is a director of the...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:200 pagesPublished:June 13, 2010Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199228000

ISBN - 13:9780199228003

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Table of Contents

Preface1. Introduction2. Objective Bayesianism3. Motivation4. Updating5. Predicate Languages6. Objective Bayesian Nets7. Probabilistic Logic8. Judgement Aggregation9. Languages and Relativity10. Objective Bayesianism in PerspectiveReferencesIndex