Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics by Marshall J. BregerIndependent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics by Marshall J. Breger

Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics

byMarshall J. Breger, Gary J. Edles

Hardcover | April 15, 2015

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It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government, as well as students of the governmental process, to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," theseagencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and they cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the privatesector, and they have foreign analogues. In Independent Agencies in the United States, Marshall Breger and Gary Edles provide a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US. This book focuses on traditional multi-member agencies that have a significant impact on the American economy,such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. This work recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create idiosyncratic administrative structuresconsisting of independent agencies squarely within the Executive Branch, including government corporations and government-sponsored enterprises, to establish a new construct of independence to meet the changing needs of the administrative state. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the generalconflict between political accountability and agency independence. This book also compares US with EU and certain UK independent agencies to offer a unique comparative perspective. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography ofpertinent materials.
Marshall J. Breger is a Professor of Law at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. He was a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in labor, regulatory and trade policy (including NAFTA). During the George H.W. Bush Administration, he served as Solicitor of Labor, the chief lawyer of the Labor D...
Title:Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and PoliticsFormat:HardcoverDimensions:592 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:April 15, 2015Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199812128

ISBN - 13:9780199812127


Table of Contents

Preface1. Introduction2. How the Independent Agency Developed: The Search For ExpertiseA. The Interstate Commerce CommissionB. The Federal Trade CommissionC. The Federal Power CommissionD. The National Labor Relations BoardE. Federal Reserve Board: Independence as NeededF. Observations3. The Modern Agency: AppointmentsA. Historical Characteristics of IndependenceB. AppointmentsC. Observations4. The Modern Agency: Removal Protection As An Indicator of IndependenceA. Early Congressional and Judicial Attacks on Removal by the PresidentB. The Historic Removal Trilogy: Myers, Humphrey's Executor and WeinerC. The Morrison "Twist"D. Grounds for RemovalE. Procedures for RemovalF. End of ServiceG. An International Twist on the Removal IssueH. Observations5. Other Indicia of IndependenceA. Control of Agency Submissions to Congress1B. Control of LitigationC. Independent Funding AuthorityD. Selection of Agency Vice ChairmenE. Other Indicia of IndependenceF. Observations6. Theories of Agency IndependenceA. Theory of the Unitary ExecutiveB. Other Efforts to Centralize Effective PowerC. The Functionalist Response to the Unitary ExecutiveD. Political Will and IndependenceE. Presidential Directive AuthorityF. Observations7. Internal Agency OperationsA. Role of the ChairmanB. Institutional Decisionmaking8. Institutional Design: The Tension Between Autonomy and AccountabilityA. IntroductionB. The Staying Power of Independent Regulatory AgenciesC. The Evolution of Independent Agencies: The Need for Accountability and Centralized AuthorityD. The Application of Centralized Regulatory Review Authority to the Independent AgenciesE. Divided Accountability: The Separation of Policy and Adversarial Functions within AgenciesF. Split-Enforcement ModelG. Shared Regulatory Space: An AssessmentH. Unsuccessful Shift to the Single Member OptionI. Successful Shift to the Single Member OptionJ. Independent Oversight AgenciesK. Independent Agencies Squarely in the Executive BranchL. Promoting Executive Branch Autonomy and Accountability to CongressM. Inspector GeneralsN. Observations9. Further Along on the Continuum: Government Function and Private EnterpriseA. Public CorporationsB. Government Constraints and Constitutional Obligations on Public CorporationsC. Government Sponsored EnterprisesD. Private Action by Federal AgenciesE. PrivatizationF. Observations10. The Independent Agency as an Institutional Art Form: Comparative ExamplesA. National Independent Entities: The United KingdomB. The Council of EuropeC. European Coal and Steel CommunityD. The Transition to a European UnionE. The European Commission TodayF. European Independent AgenciesG. Other International AdministrationH. Observations11. CONCLUSION: The Future of the Independent AgencyA. The Changing Face of Independent AgenciesB. Centralization Theory and the Pushback Against ItC. Final ThoughtsAppendix A: Multi-Member Boards and Commissions (With Selective Bibliographies)Appendix B: Comparing Independent AgenciesBibliographyIndex