The significance of this study is that it establishes the fallacy of conventional perspectives on Indian nuclear deterrence-that the Indian nuclear programme entailed 'exclusively peaceful uses' during the Nehru era and the development of weapons capability was initiated by the government ofLal Bahadur Shastri after the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. On the contrary, it provides incontrovertible documentary evidence that Dr Homi J. Bhabha formulated with Nehru's approval a nuclear weapons development strategy within the structural framework of the Indian civilian nuclearprogramme. Nehru was interested in a nuclear weapons capability for a 'deterrent in extremis'. The central premise of the study is that BJP government's decision to carry out the May 1998 nuclear tests was not an original one, but a step prefigured in a strategic continuum whose genesis dates back to the late 1950s. It suggests that the declaration of Indian nuclear deterrence after the May1998 nuclear tests, the weaponization of Indian nuclear capability and the pronouncement of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) were not separate from earlier policies, but instead were part of that strategic continuum. The study analyses the dynamics of Indian nuclear deterrence, Indian nucleardoctrine and their implications for South Asian security. It is the first time that mostly primary archival, and documentary research material from diverse sources has been explored to write a book on this topic. It is more comprehensive than any other book on this subject in terms both of its timeframe (1947 until now) and of the issues covered-theevolution, development, dynamics and implications of Indian nuclear deterrence for South Asian Security. It is also the first book on the topic written from a Pakistani perspective.