Libertarian Accounts of Free Will by Randolph ClarkeLibertarian Accounts of Free Will by Randolph Clarke

Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

byRandolph Clarke

Hardcover | August 19, 2004

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This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtlyexplores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. Hedefends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatiblewith determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
Randolph Clarke is at University of Georgia.
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Title:Libertarian Accounts of Free WillFormat:HardcoverDimensions:254 pages, 6.3 × 9.09 × 0.98 inPublished:August 19, 2004Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:019515987X

ISBN - 13:9780195159875

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Editorial Reviews

"This book is an important contribution to the debate on free will. Clarke provides a careful and comprehensive assessment of a variety of libertarian accounts. He displays impressive command of the subject and argues with subtlety and ingenuity. As far as I can tell, he significantly advancesthe discussion about such central issues as the problem of active control and the possibility of agent causation."--Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews