Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates by David PalmerLibertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates by David Palmer

Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates

EditorDavid Palmer

Hardcover | October 8, 2014

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According to the libertarian position on free will, people sometimes exercise free will, but this freedom is incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. Frequently maligned within the history of philosophy, this view has recently gained increasingly sympathetic attention amongphilosophers. But stark questions remain: How plausible is this view? If our actions are not causally determined, how can we have control over them? Why should we want our actions to be breaks in the deterministic causal chain?The recent resurgence of interest in libertarianism is due, most significantly, to Robert Kane, who is the leading contemporary defender of this view of free will. This book is a collection of new essays on the libertarian position on free will and related issues that focuses specifically on theviews of Kane. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers, the essays cover various areas of philosophy including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind. Kane contributes a final essay, replying to the criticisms offered in the previous chapters and developing his view in newdirections.
David Palmer is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Tennessee. He specializes in ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of action. He has published on the topics of free will, moral responsibility, and applied ethics.
Title:Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary DebatesFormat:HardcoverDimensions:224 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:October 8, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199860084

ISBN - 13:9780199860081

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Table of Contents

AcknowledgementsContributors1. David Palmer: Free will, libertarianism, and KanePart I: Libertarian Theories of Free Will2. Carl Ginet: Can an indeterministic cause leave a choice up to the agent?3. Timothy O'Connor: Free will and metaphysicsPart II: The Luck Objection4. Alfred Mele: Kane, luck, and control: Trying to get by without too much effort5. John Martin Fischer: Toward a solution to the luck problemPart III: Incompatibilism and Omissions6. Michael McKenna: Compatibilist ultimacy: Resisting the threat of Kane's U condition7. David Widerker and Ira M. Schnall: The direct argument for incompatibilism8. Randolph Clarke: Freedom, responsibility, and omitting to actPart IV: The Significance of Free Will9. Ishtiyaque Haji: Responsibility for emotions, alternative possibilities, and reasons10. Dana Kay Nelkin: Moral responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the significance of (libertarian) free will11. Derk Pereboom: The dialectic of selfhood and the significance of free willPart V: Kane's Reply12. Robert Kane: New arguments in debates on libertarian free will: Responses to contributorsReferencesIndex