Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge by Christopher S. HillMeaning, Mind, and Knowledge by Christopher S. Hill

Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge

byChristopher S. Hill

Hardcover | March 7, 2014

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In this collection of essays, most of which are of recent vintage, and three of which appear here for the first time, Christopher S. Hill addresses a large assortment of philosophical issues. Part I presents a deflationary theory of truth, argues that semantic properties like reference andcorrespondence with fact can also be characterized in deflationary terms, and offers an account of the value of these "thin" properties, tracing it to their ability to track more substantial properties that are informational or epistemic in character. Part II defends the view that consciousexperiences are type-identical with brain states. It addresses a large array of objections to this identity thesis, including objections based on the alleged multiple realizability of experiences, and objections based on Cartesian intuitions about the modeal separability of mind and matter. In theend, however, it maintains that theories of experience based on type-identity should give way to representationalist accounts. Part III presents a representationalist solution to the mind-body problem. It argues that all awareness, including awareness of qualia, is governed by a Kantianappearance/reality distinction - a distinction between the ways objects and properties are represented as being, and the ways they are in themselves. It also presents theories of pain and visual qualia that kick them out of the mind and assign them to locations in body and the external world. PartIV defends reliabilist theories of epistemic justification, deploys such theories in answering Cartesian skepticism, responds critically to Hawthorne's lottery problem and related proposals about the role of knowledge in conversation and practical reasoning, presents a new account of the sources ofmodeal knowledge, and proposes an account of logical and mathematical beliefs that represents them as immunune to empirical revision.
Christopher S. Hill has taught at a number of institutions, including the University of Arkansas, the University of Michigan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Pittsburgh. He is presently Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He has published three previous books, and was the editor of Philosophical T...
Title:Meaning, Mind, and KnowledgeFormat:HardcoverDimensions:352 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.03 inPublished:March 7, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199665826

ISBN - 13:9780199665822

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Table of Contents

1. IntroductionPart I: Meaning2. "gavagai" (1972)Postscript to "gavagai" (2013)3. Rudiments of a Theory of Reference (1987)4. A Substitutional Theory of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence (2006)5. How Concepts Hook onto the World (2013)Part II: A Type Materialist Theory of Experience6. In Defense of Type Materialism (1984)7. Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem (1997)8. The Identity Theory (2013)Part III: A Representationalist Theory of Experience9. OW! The Paradox of Pain (2005)10. Locating Qualia: Do They Reside in the Brain or in the Body and the World? (2012)11. Visual Awareness and Visual Qualia (2013)12. The Content of Visual Experience (2013)Part IV: Knowledge13. Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism (1996)14. Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief, (written with Joshua Schechter, 2007)15. Conceivability and Possibility (2013)16. Concepts, Teleology, and Rational Revision (2013)