Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course by James BerginMicroeconomic Theory: A Concise Course by James Bergin

Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course

byJames Bergin

Hardcover | October 14, 2005

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Microeconomic Theory is based on lecture notes for a graduate course in microeconomic theory. It covers a broad range of topics, and to some extent the lecture structure is retained in the style of the book. The author provides a clear account of the main ideas in each area concisely, andin some depth of detail. The presentation is at an advanced level and provides succinct coverage of the material in a self contained discussion. Chapters are organized and written independently making it possible to read any chapter without having read earlier material. Each chaper is written on the presumption that the reader has some familiarity with the topics or issues under discussion but would value further discussion, or a secondpoint of view . While much of the material is mainstream, a substantial portion is not available in existing textbooks. The book covers a range of topics appearing in advanced courses in microeconomic theory. Coverage includes such topics as decision theory, strategic and extensive form games,auctions, bargaining, information models, principal- agent problems, signalling and screening games, cooperative games and models of learning.
James Bergin is Professor of Economics at Queen's University and Canada Research Chair Holder. James holds degrees from Princeton, London School of Economics and the National University of Ireland. His research interests include mechanism design, learning and evolutionary game theory, and anonymous games.
Title:Microeconomic Theory: A Concise CourseFormat:HardcoverDimensions:377 pages, 9.69 × 6.73 × 1.02 inPublished:October 14, 2005Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199280290

ISBN - 13:9780199280292


Table of Contents

1. Decision Theory2. Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance3. Strategic Form Games4. Nash Equilibrium- Existence and Refinements5. Mechanism Design6. Auctions I: Independent Values7. Auctions II: Dependent Values8. Extensive Form Games9. Equilibrium in Extensive Game Forms10. Repeated Games11. Bargaining12. Information13. The Principal-Agent Problem14. Signaling15. Screening16. Common Knowledge17. Mechanism Design: Complete and Incomplete Information18. Cooperative Outcomes19. Large Games20. Evolution and Learning