Microeconomic Theory by Andreu Mas-colellMicroeconomic Theory by Andreu Mas-colell

Microeconomic Theory

byAndreu Mas-colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry R. Green

Hardcover | June 1, 1995

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Many instructors of microeconomic theory have been waiting for a text that provides balanced and in-depth analysis of the essentials of microeconomics. Masterfully combining the results of years of teaching microeconomics at Harvard University, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and JerryGreen have filled that conspicuous vacancy with their groundbreaking text, Microeconomic Theory. The authors set out to create a solid organizational foundation upon which to build the effective teaching tool for microeconomic theory. The result presents unprecedented depth of coverage in all the essential topics, while allowing professors to "tailor-make" their course to suit personalpriorities and style. Topics such as noncooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and general equilibrium under uncertainty receive the attention that reflects their stature within the discipline. The authors devote an entire section to game theory alone, making it"free-standing" to allow instructors to return to it throughout the course when convenient. Discussion is clear, accessible, and engaging, enabling the student to gradually acquire confidence as well as proficiency. Extensive exercises within each chapter help students to hone their skills, whilethe text's appendix of terms, fully cross-referenced throughout the previous five sections, offers an accessible guide to the subject matter's terminology. Teachers of microeconomics need no longer rely upon scattered lecture notes to supplement their textbooks. Deftly written by three of thefield's most influential scholars, Microeconomic Theory brings the readability, comprehensiveness, and versatility to the first-year graduate classroom that has long been missing.
Andreu Mas-Colell is at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. Michael D. Whinston is at Harvard University. Jerry R. Green is at Harvard University.
Title:Microeconomic TheoryFormat:HardcoverDimensions:1008 pages, 8.11 × 10.12 × 2.01 inPublished:June 1, 1995Publisher:Oxford University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195073401

ISBN - 13:9780195073409

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Table of Contents

Part I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKINGIntroduction to Part I 1. Preference and ChoiceA. IntroductionB. Preference RelationsC. Choice RulesD. The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice RulesExercises 2. Consumer ChoiceA. IntroductionB. CommoditiesC. The Consumption SetD. Competitive BudgetsE. Demand Functions and Comparartive StaticsF. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of DemandExercises 3. Classical Demand TheoryA. IntroductionB. Preference Relations: Basic PropertiesC. Preference and UtilityD. The Utility Maximization ProblemE. The Expenditure Minimization ProblemF. Duality: A Mathematical IntroductionG. Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure FunctionsH. IntegrabilityI. Welfare Evaluation of Economic ChangesJ. The Strong Axiom of Revealed PreferenceAppendix: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian DemandExercises 4. Aggregate DemandA. IntroductionB. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate WealthC. Aggregate Demand and the Weak AxiomD. Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative ConsumerAppendix: Regularizing Effects of AggregationExercises 5. ProductionA. IntroductionB. Production SetsC. Profit Maximization and Cost MinimizationD. The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single Output CaseE. AggregationF. Efficient ProductionG. Remarks on the Objectives of the FirmAppendix: The Linear Activity ModelExercises 6. Choice under UncertaintyA. IntroductionB. Expected Utility TheoryC. Money Lotteries and Risk AversionD. Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and RiskE. State Dependent UtilityF. Subjective Probability TheoryExercisesPart II: GAME THEORYIntroduction to Part II 7. Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative GamesA. IntroductionB. What is a Game?C. The Extensive Form Representation of a GameD. Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a GameE. Randomized ChoicesExercises 8. Simultaneous-Move GamesA. IntroductionB. Dominant and Dominated StrategiesC. Rationalizable StrategiesD. Nash EquilibriumE. Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash EquilibriumF. The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand PerfectionAppendix: Existence of Nash EquilibriumExercises 9. Dynamic GamesA. IntroductionB. Sequential Rationality, Backwards Induction, and Subgame PerfectionC. Sequential Rationality and Out-of-Equilibrium BeliefsD. Reasonable Beliefs, Forward Induction, and Normal Form RefinementsAppendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral BargainingAppendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand PerfectionExercisesPart III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILUREIntroduction to Part III10. Competitive MarketsA. IntroductionB. Pareto Optimality and Competitive EquilibriaC. Partial Equilibrium Competitive AnalysisD. The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium ContextE. Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium ModelF. Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive EquilibriaG. Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium AnalysisExercises11. Externalities and Public GoodsA. IntroductionB. A Simple Bilateral ExternalityC. Public GoodsD. Multilateral ExternalitiesE. Private Information and Second-Best SolutionsAppendix: Non-Convexities and the Theory of ExternalitiesExercises12. Market PowerA. IntroductionB. Monopoly PricingC. Static Models of OligopolyD. Repeated InteractionE. EntryF. The Competitive LimitG. Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future CompetitionAppendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk TheoremAppendix B: Strategic Entry Deterrence and AccommodationExercises13. Adverse Selection, Signalling, and ScreeningA. IntroductionB. Informational Asymmetries and Adverse SelectionC. SignallingD. ScreeningAppendix: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signalling GamesExercises14. The Principal-Agent ProblemA. IntroductionB. Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard)C. Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening)D. Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid ModelsAppendix A: Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action ModelAppendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden InformationExercisesPart IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUMIntroduction to Part IV15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some ExamplesA. IntroductionB. Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth BoxC. The One Consumer-One Producer EconomyD. The 2x2 Production ModelE. General versus Partial Equilibrium TheoryExercises16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare PropertiesA. IntroductionB. The Basic Model and DefinitionsC. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare EconomicsD. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare EconomicsE. Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare OptimaF. First-Order Conditions for Pareto OptimalityG. Some ApplicationsAppendix: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible AllocationsExercises17. The Positive Theory of EquilibriumA. IntroductionB. Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic EquationsC. Existence of Walrasian EquilibriumD. Local Uniqueness and the Index TheoremE. Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu TheoremF. Uniqueness of EquilibriaG. Comparative Statics AnalysisH. Tatonnement StabilityI. Large Economies and Non-ConvexitiesAppendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare EquationsAppendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian EquilibriumExercises18. Some Foundations for Competitive EquilibriaA. IntroductionB. Core and EquilibriaC. Non-Cooperative Foundations of Walrasian EquilibriaD. The Limits to RedistributionE. Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity PrincipleAppendix: Cooperative Game TheoryExercises19. General Equilibrium under UncertaintyA. IntroductionB. A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: DescriptionC. Arrow-Debreu EquilibriumD. Sequential TradeE. Asset MarketsF. Incomplete MarketsG. Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models under UncertaintyH. Imperfect InformationExercises20. Equilibrium and TimeA. IntroductionB. Intertemporal UtilityC. Intertemporal Production and EfficiencyD. Equilibrium: The One-Consumer CaseE. Stationary Programs, Interest Rates, and Golden RulesF. DynamicsG. Equilibrium: Several ConsumersH. Overlapping GenerationsI. Remarks on Non-Equilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and LearningExercisesPart V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVESIntroduction to Part V21. Social Choice TheoryA. IntroductionB. A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two AlternativesC. The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility TheoremD. Some Possibility Results: Restricted DomainsE. Social Choice FunctionsExercises22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic BargainingA. IntroductionB. Utility Possibility SetsC. Social Welfare Functions and Social OptimaD. Invariance Properties of Social Welfare FunctionsE. The Axiomatic Bargaining ApproachF. Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley ValueExercises23. Incentives and Mechanism DesignA. IntroductionB. The Mechanism Design ProblemC. Dominant Strategy ImplementationD. Bayesian ImplementationE. Participation ConstraintsF. Optimal Bayesian MechanismsAppendix A: Implementation and Multiple EquilibriaAppendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete InformationExercisesMathematical AppendixA. IntroductionB. Homogeneous Functions and Euler's FormulaC. Concave and Quasiconcave FunctionsD. Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other PropertiesE. The Implicit Function TheoremF. Continuous Functions and Compact SetsG. Convex Sets and Separating HyperplanesH. CorrespondencesI. Fixed Point TheoremsJ. Unconstrained MaximizationK. Constrained MaximizationL. The Envelope TheoremM. Linear ProgrammingN. Dynamic Programming

Editorial Reviews

"Sets the standard by which all graduate micro texts must be judged."--David Nickerson, American University