Moral Aggregation by Iwao HiroseMoral Aggregation by Iwao Hirose

Moral Aggregation

byIwao Hirose

Hardcover | October 29, 2014

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Some ethical theories tolerate or require aggregation - a trade-off between benefits to a group of individuals and losses to another group of individuals. Since aggregation is an essential feature of utilitarianism, many critics of utilitarianism - including John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, T. M.Scanlon, and others - rule out aggregation from their proposed theories. However, critics encounter what has become known as the number problem - the problem that non-aggregative theories are insensitive to the number of people affected by actions even in the cases where the number of people isclearly relevant to what we ought to do. In this book, Iwao Hirose elucidates the theoretical nature of interpersonal and intra-personal aggregation and defends a form of aggregation, formal aggregation, as distinguished from substantive aggregation in utilitarianism. Substantive aggregation combines the morally relevant factors that aredetermined prior to, and independently of, aggregative process, and identifies the goal to be pursued. In contrast, formal aggregation represents the overall ethical judgment in terms of individuals' morally relevant factors and gives a structure to our ethical thinking. Hirose's view of formal aggregation is broader than substantive aggregation and avoids problems for utilitarianism. Furthermore, formal aggregation can satisfy the demands of critics of the conventional understanding of aggregation, thus being more attractive than substantive aggregation and theunqualified rejection of aggregation. Hirose's analysis thus elucidates the far-reaching scope of aggregation and offers a new insight to one of the fundamental elements in ethical theory.
Iwao Hirose is Associate Professor at the Philosophy Department and the School of Environment, McGill University. He is the author of Egalitarianism (2014), co-author of The Ethics of Health Care Rationing (with Greg Bognar, 2014), and co-editor of Weighing and Reasoning (with Andrew Reisner; forthcoming from OUP) and The Oxford Handbo...
Title:Moral AggregationFormat:HardcoverDimensions:256 pages, 8.25 × 5.5 × 0.98 inPublished:October 29, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199933685

ISBN - 13:9780199933686


Table of Contents

I A Theory of Aggregation1. Why Aggregation?1.1 Aggregation in ethics1.2 Example I: QALY aggregation1.3 Example II: Taurek's Rescue Case Rescue Case1.4 The structure of this book2. The Structure of Aggregation2.1 Aggregation defined2.2 What is aggregative and what is not?2.3 The structure of interpersonal aggregation2.3.1 Interpersonal comparability2.3.2 Impartiality2.3.3 Pareto2.3.4 Continuity3. Formal and Substantive Aggregation3.1 Counterexample to interpersonal aggregation: the World Cup Case3.2 Hidden assumptions3.3 Substantive and formal aggregation aggregation3.4 Formal aggregation in perspective4. Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons4.1 The separateness of persons: Rawls's strict account4.2 The wider account4.3 Defusing the wider account4.4 The separateness objection and contractarianism4.5 Scanlon's contractualism5. Intra-Personal Aggregation5.1 Who supports intra-personal aggregation?5.2 The structure of intra-personal aggregation5.3 The objection to intra-personal continuity5.4 The objection to temporal symmetryII The Number Problem6. Taurek's argument for the coin-toss6.1 Taurek and the Rescue Case6.2 Taurek (1): the permissibility claim6.3 Taurek (2): the no-worse claim6.4 Taurek (3): the equal respect claim6.5 Two remarks on Taurek's argument Taurek's argument6.6 Critics of aggregation (1): Nozick6.7 Critics of aggregation (2): Rawls6.8 Critics of aggregation (3): Nagel6.9 Three solutions and many intuitions7. Four Responses: Kavka, Kamm, Scanlon, and Schelling7.1 How to deal with Taurek's claim?7.2 Kavka on Taurek7.3 The Kamm-Scanlon argument Kamm-Scanlon argument7.4 Kamm's Argument for Best Outcomes7.5 Schelling's probabilistic argument8. Irrelevant Utilities and Formal Aggregation8.1 The principle of irrelevant utilities8.2 The objection to the principle of irrelevant utilities8.3 Taking unfairness seriously8.4 The Large Scale Rescue Case revisited8.5 The force of aggregation9. Weighted Lotteries9.1 The third proposal: weighted lotteries9.2 The appeal of weighted lotteries9.3 The procedure of proportional chances: two criticisms criticisms9.4 The general weighted lotteries: two-step criticism9.5 An additional problemConclusion