NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility 1966-67 by Helga HaftendornNATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility 1966-67 by Helga Haftendorn

NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility 1966-67

byHelga Haftendorn

Hardcover | November 1, 1993

Pricing and Purchase Info

$297.50 online 
$495.00 list price save 39%
Earn 1,488 plum® points

Prices and offers may vary in store


In stock online

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores


This book deals with the crucially important NATO crises of 1966-67 - a period when a number of issues which had been developing for some time within NATO came to a head. It concentrates on the intensive reorientation of NATO strategy from the departure of France from the integrated militarycommand to the adoption of Flexible Response and the Hermel report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance. The author sets out the diplomacy of this period in a broader historical and theoretical context and provides four detailed, and related, case studies. The first case deals with problems of doctrine stemming from American determination to reduce NATO's dependence on what it believed to beincredible nuclear threats and the European resistance to any diminution of the US nuclear guarantee. The second case considers the attempt to ease European concerns about dependence on American nuclear policy. The third examines the programmatic consequences of the strategic shift. Finally, thereis an analysis of the process by which the Harmel Report was set up to establish political guidance for the Alliance in the context of the French withdrawal and the move to detente.
Helga Haftendorn is at Free University of Berlin.
Title:NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility 1966-67Format:HardcoverDimensions:460 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 1.14 inPublished:November 1, 1993Publisher:Oxford University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198280033

ISBN - 13:9780198280033

Look for similar items by category:


From Our Editors

Using French President de Gaulle's March 1966 threat to leave NATO as a starting point, this book tells a three-fold story. First, it gives a penetrating analysis how the North Atlantic Alliance has coped with the nuclear revolution and has overcome the crisis of credibility in European-American relations when the strategy of massive retaliation had lost its usefulness. Second, it reports how the disagreements in NATO were finally resolved and a new strategic concept (MC 14/3) was adopted, agreement on force planning, troop stationing and offset achieved, a formula for nuclear consultation found, and the Harmel Report on the management of East-West detente accepted. Third, it challenges some of the dominant theoretical explanations by structural realists and liberal institutionalists relating to alliance cohesion against the empirical findings of the case studies.

Editorial Reviews

`Basing her research on archives mainly in the USA and Germany, on interviews, news-clipping collections and a host of secondary literature, she achieves once again the high standard of meticulous historical detective work which has already characterised her previous word on nuclear strategy... Helga Haftendorn's book satisfies all the many expectations that one might bring to it: the historian, the political scientist, the strategist, and even the casual reader will find a lucidly written, well-structured and clearly argued book that is a major record of NATO history ... a masterpieceof scholarly work, and yet without an ounce of superfluous waffle or fat. The detail of the footnoting, the work that has gone into verifying finest details are a joy to behold for anybody who suspects that true standards of scholarship have died out with the increasing pressure for swiftpublication.'Beatrice Heuser, Contrmpory British History Vol.11 No.1 1997