Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective by Lynne Rudder BakerNaturalism and the First-Person Perspective by Lynne Rudder Baker

Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective

byLynne Rudder Baker

Paperback | April 11, 2013

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Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive andeliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreduciblypersonal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentaryfirst-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in whichfirst-person perspectives contribute to reality.
Lynne Rudder Baker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Baker has written four books on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and has published many articles in philosophy journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Nous, Philosophy and P...
Title:Naturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveFormat:PaperbackDimensions:272 pages, 8.25 × 5.5 × 0.68 inPublished:April 11, 2013Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199914745

ISBN - 13:9780199914746

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Table of Contents

Introduction: What is the Problem?The Claim of NaturalismA Challenge to NaturalismWhat is at StakeAn OverviewPart I: The Core Argument1. Varieties of NaturalismWhat Counts As 'Science'?Reductive NaturalismNonreductive NaturalismDisenchantment and Optimism2. On Naturalizing the First-Person PerspectiveWhat is Naturalization?The Robust First-Person PerspectiveThe Rudimentary First-Person Perspective3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person PerspectiveJohn Perry on an Epistemic Account of the SelfDavid Lewis on De Se BeliefA Comment on John SearleCan Cognitive Science Save the Day?4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person PerspectiveDaniel Dennett on ConsciousnessThomas Metzinger on a Self-Model TheoryMy Recommendation5. Arguments Against First-Person NaturalizationFrom First-Person Concepts to First-Person PropertiesA Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person PropertiesA Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological NaturalismPart II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person PerspectiveThe First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-ConsciousnessLanguage and the Acquisition of ConceptsHow to Acquire a Self-ConceptHuman Persons: Wrap Up7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?Personal Identity: A First-Personal ApproachObjections and RepliesMark Johnston on the Self as IllusoryJohnston's Critique Side-Stepped8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person PerspectiveFirst-Person PropertiesDispositional PropertiesHaecceitistic Implications9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person PerspectivePersonhoodAgencyArtifactsMoral Responsibility10. Natural RealityNear-NaturalismProperty-Constitution and CausationEmergentism and Downward CausationHow Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?