New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment by Carlo CarraroNew Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment by Carlo Carraro

New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment

EditorCarlo Carraro, Domenico Siniscalco

Paperback | September 3, 2009

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This volume provides a broad survey of the recent developments in the new economics of the environment and reports the state of the art on a new set of environmental problems, analytical tools and economic policies. Throughout the volume environmental problems are analyzed in an open, generally noncompetitive economy with transnational or global externalities. The first part deals with the relationship between the environment, economic growth and technological innovation. The second part analyzes the optimal design of environmental taxation, while the third part considers the international dimension of environmental policy.
Title:New Directions in the Economic Theory of the EnvironmentFormat:PaperbackDimensions:376 pages, 9.02 × 5.98 × 0.83 inPublished:September 3, 2009Publisher:Cambridge University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0521118913

ISBN - 13:9780521118910

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Table of Contents

1. Theoretical frontiers of environmental economics Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco; 2. Growth with natural and environmental resources Andrea Beltratti; 3. Environmental policy and technological innovation David Ulph; 4. Environmental policy, distortionary labour taxation and employment: pollution taxes and the double-dividend A. Lans Bovenberg; 5. International coordination of environmental taxes Michael Hoel; 6. Environmental policy and international trade: a survey of recent economic analysis Alistair Ulph; 7. Environmental regulation and international capital allocation Michael Rauscher; 8. Towards a theory of international cooperationScott Barrett; 9. Group formation in games without spillovers Hideo Konishi, Michel le Breton and Shlomo Weber; 10. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers Francis Bloch; Index.