Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction by John L. PollockNomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction by John L. Pollock

Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction

byJohn L. Pollock

Hardcover | April 30, 1999

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In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their relationship to the problem of induction. He argues that probability is fundamental not only to physical science, but to induction,epistemology, the philosophy of science and much of the reasoning relevant to artificial intelligence. Pollock's main claim is that the fundamental notion of probability is nomic--that is, it involves the notion of natural law, valid across possible worlds. The various epistemic and statisticalconceptions of probability, he demonstrates, are derived from this nomic notion. He goes on to provide a theory of statistical induction, an account of computational principles allowing some probabilities to be derived from others, an account of acceptance rules, and a theory of directinference.
John L. Pollock is at University of Arizona, Tucson.
Title:Nomic Probability and the Foundations of InductionFormat:HardcoverDimensions:368 pages, 8.54 × 5.83 × 1.22 inPublished:April 30, 1999Publisher:Oxford University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:019506013X

ISBN - 13:9780195060133

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Editorial Reviews

"There is no doubt whatsoever that this book will be a serious contribution to the field. No one, I am confident, has even come close to developing as thorough and persuasive a treatment of uncertain reasoning and its relation to nomic probability. It is very impressive. The unity thatPollock's book introduces to the treatment of statistics, induction, nonmonotonic reasoning in AI, and defeasible reasoning in epistemology, constitutes a permanent contribution in itself."--Henry Kyburg, University of Rochester