Normativity: Epistemic and Practical by Conor McHughNormativity: Epistemic and Practical by Conor McHugh

Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

EditorConor McHugh, Jonathan Way, Daniel Whiting

Hardcover | February 22, 2018

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What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology,and vice versa. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers focuses on a central concern of both epistemology and ethics: normativity. Normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do orto think, and so on. The volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. It represents a burgeoning research programme in which epistemic and practical normativity are seen as two aspectsof a single topic, deeply interdependent and raising parallel questions.
Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics broadly construed. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism and self-kno...
Title:Normativity: Epistemic and PracticalFormat:HardcoverDimensions:272 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.03 inPublished:February 22, 2018Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198758707

ISBN - 13:9780198758709

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Table of Contents

Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting: Introduction1. Charity Anderson: Putting Fallibilism to Work2. Jessica Brown: Pragmatic Approaches to Belief3. Ulrike Heuer: The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons4. David Hunter: Directives for Knowledge and Belief5. Benjamin Kiesewetter: How Reasons are Sensitive to Available Evidence6. Clayton Littlejohn: Evidence and its Limits7. Errol Lord: The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason8. Matthew McGrath: Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems are Your Problems!9. Kate Nolfi: Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief10. Baron Reed: Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief11. Andrew Reisner: Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity12. Daniel Star: Reasoning with Reasons13. Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen: Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief