Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6 by Russ Shafer-LandauOxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6 by Russ Shafer-Landau

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6

EditorRuss Shafer-Landau

Paperback | July 8, 2011

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Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections ofethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethicswould do well to start here.
Russ Shafer-Landau is professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, and Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP 2004).
Title:Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6Format:PaperbackDimensions:336 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 0.78 inPublished:July 8, 2011Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199606382

ISBN - 13:9780199606382

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Table of Contents

Introduction1. Sharon Street: Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways2. Allan Gibbard: How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts3. David Sobel: Parfit's Case against Subjectivism4. Chris Heathwood: Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare5. Sarah McGrath: Moral Knowledge and Experience6. Matt Bedke: Passing the Deontic Buck7. Richard Joyce: The Accidental Error Theorist8. Jonas Olson: Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism9. Campbell Brown: A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism10. Paul Katsafanas: Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency11. Julia Markovits: Why be An Internalist about Reasons?12. Ralph Wedgwood: Instrumental RationalityIndex