Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1 by Dean ZimmermanOxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1 by Dean Zimmerman

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1

EditorDean Zimmerman

Paperback | January 20, 2004

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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a major new series dedicated to the timely publication of new work in this highly fertile field of philosophy. The subject is broadly construed, taken to include not only perennially central topics (modality, ontology, and mereology; metaphysical theories ofcausation, laws of nature, persistence through time, and time itself; and realism and anti-realism in the many senses of these terms); but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions that open up within other subfields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science (questions aboutsupervenience and materialism, the nature of qualia, mental causation, metaphysical implications of relativity and quantum physics, mereological theories of biological species, and so on). Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium thatallows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Each future volume shall also include an essay by the winner of the Oxford Studies in Metaphysics younger scholar award, a prize inaugurated with this first issue.
Dean Zimmerman is in the Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Jersey.
Title:Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1Format:PaperbackDimensions:346 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 0.72 inPublished:January 20, 2004Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199267731

ISBN - 13:9780199267736

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Table of Contents

I. Presentism1. David Lewis: Tensed Qualifiers2. Ned Markosian: A Defense of Presentism3. Symposium: Defining PresentismThomas M. Crisp: On Presentism and TrivialityPeter Ludlow: Presentism, Triviality, and the Varieties of TensismThomas M. Crisp: Reply to Ludlow4. Simon Keller: Presentism and TruthmakingII. Universals5. Peter van Inwagen: A Theory of Properties6. D. M. Armstrong: How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?7. Cian Dorr: Non-symmetric RelationsIII. Freedom, Causal Powers, and Causation8. Peter Unger: The Mental Problems of the Many9. John Heil: Properties and Powers10. Ned Hall: The Intrinsic Character of Causation11. Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne, and Mark Scala: Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?