Personal Bankruptcy Law: An Economic Analysis by Eva-Maria SteigerPersonal Bankruptcy Law: An Economic Analysis by Eva-Maria Steiger

Personal Bankruptcy Law: An Economic Analysis

byEva-Maria Steiger

Paperback | May 30, 2005

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Eva-Maria Steiger classifies the mechanisms triggered by U.S. and European consumer bankruptcy regulations and tests them within a hidden action model. She identifies an influence on consumer effort choice at two dates - prior to distress and post filing -, appraises the capacity of the regulations to implement the efficient choice at both dates, and proposes a regulation to mitigate the identified distortions.
Dr. Eva-Maria Steiger promovierte am interdisziplinären Graduiertenkolleg Recht und Ökonomik der Universität Hamburg. Sie ist wissenschaftliche Assistentin am Walther-Rathenau-Institut für Organisationstheorie der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.
Title:Personal Bankruptcy Law: An Economic AnalysisFormat:PaperbackDimensions:127 pagesPublished:May 30, 2005Publisher:Deutscher UniversitätsverlagLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:3824483440

ISBN - 13:9783824483440

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction.- 2 Legal Background and Extant Literature.- 3 The Model.- 3.1 Setting.- 3.2 Conventionalized Bankruptcy Regulations.- 4 Ex-Post Analysis.- 4.1 First-Best.- 4.2 Performance of Existing Rules.- 4.3 Proposal.- 4.3.1 Inter-temporal Considerations.- 4.3.2 Effects of Risk-Aversion.- Discrete Effort.- Continuous Effort.- 4.4 Other Reform Proposals.- 4.4.1 Variable Period of Good Conduct.- 4.4.2 Partial Garnishment.- 4.4.3 Period of Supervision.- 4.5 Return to the Creditor.- 4.6 Numerical Example.- 4.7 Discussion.- 4.8 Results and Implications.- 5 Ex-Ante Analysis.- 5.1 Setting.- 5.2 First Best.- 5.3 Performance of Various Rules.- 5.3.1 Chapter 7.- 5.3.2 No Debt Release.- 5.3.3 German Regulation.- 5.3.4 Proposal.- 5.4 Extensions.- 5.4.1 Collateral.- Reaffirmations under Chapter 7.- Reaffirmations and Out-of-Court Negotiations under other Regulations.- 5.4.2 Changes in Income Expectations.- 5.4.3 Stigma and other Non-Monetray Penalties.- 5.5 Numerical Example.- 5.6 Risk Attitude.- 5.6.1 Risk Aversion.- 5.6.2 Time Dependent Choice.- 5.6.3 Bounded Rationality.- 5.7 Discussion.- 5.8 Results.- 6 Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post Efficiency.- 7 Conclusion.