Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Hardcover | September 20, 2015

EditorPaul Coates, Sam Coleman

not yet rated|write a review
What are phenomenal qualities, the qualities of conscious experiences? How do the phenomenal aspects of conscious experiences relate to brain processes? To what extent do experiences represent the things around us, or the states of our own bodies? Are phenomenal qualities subjective,belonging to inner mental episodes of some kind, and merely dependent on our brains? Or should they be seen as objective, belonging in some way to the physical things in the world around us? Are they physical properties at all? The problematic nature of phenomenal qualities makes it hard tounderstand how the mind is related to the physical world. There is no settled view about these issues, which concern some of the deepest, and most central, problems in philosophy. Fourteen original papers, written by a team of distinguished philosophers and psychologists and set in context by a full introduction, explore the ways in which phenomenal qualities fit in with our understanding of mind and reality. The topics covered include: phenomenal concepts, the relation of sensory qualities to the modalities, the limits of current theories about physical matter; problems about the nature of perceptual experience, projectivism, and the extent to which perception is direct; non-conceptual content, therepresentational nature of pain experience, and the phenomenology of thought; and issues relating to empirical work on synaesthesia, psychological theories of attention, and prospects for unifying the phenomenal array with neurophysiological accounts of the brain. This volume offers an indispensableresource for anyone wishing to understand the nature of conscious experience.

Pricing and Purchase Info

$105.00

Ships within 1-3 weeks
Ships free on orders over $25

From the Publisher

What are phenomenal qualities, the qualities of conscious experiences? How do the phenomenal aspects of conscious experiences relate to brain processes? To what extent do experiences represent the things around us, or the states of our own bodies? Are phenomenal qualities subjective,belonging to inner mental episodes of some kind, and...

Paul Coates is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire, where he was head of department. He has served as president of the Mind Association, and has been the recipient of several research awards, most recently from the Arts and Humanities Research Council to lead a major project exploring the nature of Pheno...

other books by Paul Coates

Cinema, Religion And The Romantic Legacy
Cinema, Religion And The Romantic Legacy

Hardcover|Jan 28 2003

$201.28 online$236.14list price
The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism
The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Percept...

Paperback|Jun 22 2009

$73.76 online$76.90list price
see all books by Paul Coates
Format:HardcoverDimensions:360 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 1.25 inPublished:September 20, 2015Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198712715

ISBN - 13:9780198712718

Look for similar items by category:

Customer Reviews of Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Reviews

Extra Content

Table of Contents

IntroductionPaul Coates and Sam Coleman: The Nature of Phenomenal QualitiesSection I. The Ontology of Phenomenal Qualities1. David Rosenthal: Quality Spaces and Sensory Modalities2. Sam Coleman: Neuro-Cosmology3. Howard Robinson: Phenomenal Qualities: What They Must Be, and What They Cannot Be4. Philip Goff: Real Acquaintance and PhysicalismSection II. Perception and Phenomenal Qualities5. Michael Martin: Moore's Dilemma6. Paul Coates: Projection, Revelation, and the Function of Perception7. Galen Strawson: Real Direct Realism: Reflections on PerceptionSection III. The Kinds and Character of Phenomenal Qualities8. E. J. Lowe: A New Argument for Realism from Perceptual Content9. David Papineau: Can We Really See a Million Colours?10. Michael Tye: The Nature of Pain and the Appearance/Reality Distinction11. Michelle Montague: The Life of the MindSection IV. Phenomenal Qualities and Empirical Findings12. Ronald A. Rensink: A Function-Centered Taxonomy of Visual Attention13. Ophelia Deroy: Can Sounds be Red? A New Account of Synaesthesia as Enriched Experience14. John M. Nicholas: Technical Issues in Naive Sense-Datum Theory