Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy

Hardcover | February 9, 2000

byPaul Allen

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This intriguing book argues that the sixteenth-century treaties King Philip III forged with Spain's most powerful enemies were not intended to ensure a permanent peace. Instead, the author shows, Philip's plan was to lull his foes, thereby enabling Spain to regain its strength after fifty years of incessant and expensive warfare. Ending the truce and resuming war with the Dutch, the English, and the French were all a part of the grand strategy.

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From Our Editors

After half a century of constant and costly war against powerful rivals France, Britain and the Netherlands, Spain’s King Phillip III felt compelled to negotiate a peace with his enemies. In Phillip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621, Paul Allen draws on primary sources from many nations to argue that the cessation of hostilities...

From the Publisher

This intriguing book argues that the sixteenth-century treaties King Philip III forged with Spain's most powerful enemies were not intended to ensure a permanent peace. Instead, the author shows, Philip's plan was to lull his foes, thereby enabling Spain to regain its strength after fifty years of incessant and expensive warfare. Endin...

Format:HardcoverDimensions:352 pages, 9.25 × 6.13 × 0.98 inPublished:February 9, 2000Publisher:Yale University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0300076827

ISBN - 13:9780300076820

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From Our Editors

After half a century of constant and costly war against powerful rivals France, Britain and the Netherlands, Spain’s King Phillip III felt compelled to negotiate a peace with his enemies. In Phillip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621, Paul Allen draws on primary sources from many nations to argue that the cessation of hostilities was purely part of a larger strategy to lull Spain’s opponents into a false sense of security until the nation had rebuilt its military strength. He demonstrates that the end of the Twelve Years’ Truce was caused not as much by the failure of peace as Spanish belief they were strong enough to overcome their rivals.