Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State

Hardcover | September 30, 2010

byPeter L. Lindseth

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The implications of European integration for national democracy and constitutionalism are well known. Nevertheless, as the events of the last decade made clear, the EU's complex system of governance has been unable to achieve a democratic or constitutional legitimacy in its own right. InPower and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State, Peter L. Lindseth traces the roots of this paradox to integration's dependence on the postwar constitutional settlement of administrative governance on the national level. Supranational policymaking has relied on various forms of oversight from national constitutional bodies, following models that were first developed in the administrative state and then translated into the European context. These national oversight mechanisms (executive, legislative, and judicial)have over the last half-century developed to address the central disconnect in the integration process: between the need for supranational regulatory power, on the one hand, and the persistence of national constitutional legitimacy, on the other. In defining the ways European public law has soughtto reconcile these two conflicting demands, Professor Lindseth lays the foundation for a better understanding of the "administrative, not constitutional" nature of European governance going forward.

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The implications of European integration for national democracy and constitutionalism are well known. Nevertheless, as the events of the last decade made clear, the EU's complex system of governance has been unable to achieve a democratic or constitutional legitimacy in its own right. InPower and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and t...

Peter L. Lindseth is the Olimpiad S. Ioffe Professor of International and Comparative Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law. He has previously taught at Yale, Princeton, and Columbia, and has also held fellowships at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History (Frankfurt), the European University Institute (Flore...
Format:HardcoverDimensions:342 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:September 30, 2010Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195390148

ISBN - 13:9780195390148

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Table of Contents

PrefaceCitation FormsAbbreviationsIntroduction: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-StateRepresentative Government, Democratic Legitimacy, and "Europe"Administrative Governance and the Distinction between Control and Legitimation of Regulatory PowerNational Legitimation and the Administrative Character of European Governance1. Situating the Argument: Legal History, Institutional Change, and Integration Theory1.1 Administrative Governance as an Alternative Analytical Framework1.2 Delegation as a Normative-Legal Principle1.3 The Importance of National Antecedents2. The Interwar Crisis and the Postwar Constitutional Settlement of Administrative Governance2.1 The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and Lessons Learned2.2 Elements of the Postwar Constitutional SettlementDelegation and the Legislative Function RedefinedTechnocracy and the Leadership of the National ExecutiveCourts as Commitment Mechanisms: Collective Democracy and Individual Rights2.3 Mediated Legitimacy and the Conditions for Constitutional Stability in the Two Postwar Eras3. Supranational Delegation and National Executive Leadership since the 1950s3.1 A "New Deal" for Europe?: Technocratic Autonomy, the Treaty of Paris, and a National Executive Role3.2 Toward National Executive Control?: Negotiating the Treaty of Rome3.3 From Control to Oversight: the Luxembourg Compromise, the European Council, and Beyond4. Supranational Delegation and National Judicial Review since the 1960s4.1 The European Court of Justice and Judicially Sanctioned "Spill-over"4.2 Defining National Judicial Deference to Supranational Delegation, 1960s-1980s4.3 Defining the Limits of Strong Deference: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the Constitutional Politics and Jurisprudence of the Last Two Decades5. Supranational Delegation and National Parliamentary Scrutiny since the 1970s5.1 The Pivotal Change: Subsidiarity and the Expansion of Supranational Regulatory Power after 19865.2 The Institutionalization of National Parliamentary Scrutiny under National Law since the 1970s5.3 Toward a "Polycentric" Constitutional Settlement: National Parliaments and Subsidiarity under Supranational Law in the 2000sConclusion: The Challenge of Legitimizing "Europeanized" Administrative GovernanceBeyond Delegation?: Density, Democracy, and Polycentric ConstitutionalismLegitimation and Control Revisited: Toward a European Conflicts Tribunal?Sovereignty, the Nation-State, and Integration HistoryBibliography