Propositions by Trenton MerricksPropositions by Trenton Merricks


byTrenton Merricks

Hardcover | April 16, 2015

Pricing and Purchase Info

$69.25 online 
$81.95 list price save 15%
Earn 346 plum® points

Prices and offers may vary in store


Ships within 1-3 weeks

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores


Propositions has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, Trenton Merricks draws a variety of controversial conclusions about related issues, including, among others, supervaluationism, thenature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts. An argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. Propositions begins with the assumption that some arguments are modally valid. Merricks then argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments are not sentences. Instead,he argues, they are propositions. So, because there are modally valid arguments, there are propositions. Merricks defends the claim that propositions are not structured and are not sets of possible worlds. He thereby presents arguments against the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. Those arguments are intended not only to oppose those accounts, but also to deliver conclusions aboutwhat a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should say. Of particular importance in this regard are arguments concerning the alleged explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to represent thing as being a certain way. Merricks then defendshis own account of the nature of propositions, which says only that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way.
Trenton Merricks is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. He is the author of Objects and Persons (OUP, 2001), Truth and Ontology (OUP, 2007), and many articles in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion.
Title:PropositionsFormat:HardcoverDimensions:256 pages, 7.99 × 5.31 × 0.87 inPublished:April 16, 2015Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198732562

ISBN - 13:9780198732563

Look for similar items by category:


Table of Contents

AcknowledgementsIntroduction1. Propositions and Modal Validity2. Logical Validity and Modal Validity3. Propositions Are Not Sets of Possible Worlds4. Against Structured Propositions5. Singular Propositions6. The Nature of PropositionsReferencesIndex