Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Paperback | July 5, 2014

byMichael G. Titelbaum

not yet rated|write a review
Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, itis widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day--cases in which agents forget information, or in which they assign degrees of belief to self-locating claims. Quitting Certainties argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability of Conditionalization(Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at an earlier time to less-than-certainty later on. It then presents a new Bayesian updating framework that accurately represents rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.Titelbaum develops this new framework from the ground up, assuming little technical background on the part of his reader. He interprets Bayesian theories as formal models of rational requirements, leading him to discuss both the elements that go into a formal model and the general principles thatlink formal systems to norms. By reinterpreting Bayesian methodology and altering the theory's updating rules, Titelbaum is able to respond to a host of challenges to Bayesianism both old and new. These responses lead in turn to deeper questions about commitment, consistency, and the nature ofinformation.Quitting Certainties presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesian framework unifying the treatment of memory loss and context-sensitivity. It develops this framework, motivates it, compares it to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory ofidentity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics.

Pricing and Purchase Info

$42.67 online
$47.50 list price (save 10%)
In stock online
Ships free on orders over $25

From the Publisher

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, itis widely recognized to fail for situations...

Michael G. Titelbaum grew up in the San Francisco Bay Area. He completed a BA in philosophy at Harvard College, a PhD in philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, and a postdoc at the Australian National University. He is an Assistant Professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Format:PaperbackDimensions:362 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.68 inPublished:July 5, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199687609

ISBN - 13:9780199687602

Look for similar items by category:

Customer Reviews of Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Reviews

Extra Content

Table of Contents

I: Going Modeling1. Introduction2. Models and NormsII Elements of CLF3. Modeling Framework4. Applying CLF Models to Stories5. Three ObjectionsIII Memory Loss6. Generalized Conditionalization7. Suppositional ConsistencyIV Context-Sensitivity8. The Proper Expansion Principle9. Applying (PEP)10. Alternative Updating Schemes11. Indierence and QuantumV Conclusion12. Loose Ends13. Modeling AdvantagesProofs