Repeated Games And Reputations: Long-run Relationships by George J. MailathRepeated Games And Reputations: Long-run Relationships by George J. Mailath

Repeated Games And Reputations: Long-run Relationships

byGeorge J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson

Hardcover | September 15, 2006

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Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of thefundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools ofdecomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in thisarea, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in thetheory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
George J. Mailath (Ph. D., Princeton University) is the Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. Larry Samuelson (Ph. D., University of Illinois) is the Antoine Augustin Cournot Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin.
Title:Repeated Games And Reputations: Long-run RelationshipsFormat:HardcoverDimensions:672 pages, 7.09 × 10 × 1.42 inPublished:September 15, 2006Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195300793

ISBN - 13:9780195300796


Table of Contents

1. IntroductionPART I. Games with Perfect Monitoring2. The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring3. The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring4. How Long Is Forever?5. Variations on the Game6. ApplicationsPART II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring7. The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring8. Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs9. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring10. Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring11. ApplicationsPART III. Games with Private Monitoring12. Private Monitoring13. Almost Public Monitoring Games14. Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring GamesPART IV. Reputations15. Reputations with Short-Lived Players16. Reputations with Long-Lived Players17. Finitely Repeated Games18. Modeling Reputations

Editorial Reviews

"Theorists use repeated games to understand self-enforcing contracts, and to explore the power of reputation formation in strategic settings. The centrality of these ideas explains why, despite the technical challenges involved, the literature on repeated games has grown rapidly in recentyears. With their masterful treatment of many of the most important parts of this vast territory, Mailath and Samuelson have done a great service to both students and researchers."--David G. Pearce, Department of Economics, New York University