Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition by Philip RobichaudResponsibility: The Epistemic Condition by Philip Robichaud

Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

EditorPhilip Robichaud, Jan Willem Wieland

Hardcover | July 22, 2017

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Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisinglyenough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one'sculture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty?Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
Philip Robichaud received his PhD from Rice University in 2012 for a dissertation on the epistemic condition. From 2013-2016 he was a postdoc on the "Enhancing Responsibility' project at Delft University of Technology, before taking up a tenure track position at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His current research project entitled "Nudgi...
Title:Responsibility: The Epistemic ConditionFormat:HardcoverDimensions:320 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.03 inPublished:July 22, 2017Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198779666

ISBN - 13:9780198779667

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Table of Contents

Jan Willem Wieland: Introduction: The Epistemic Condition1. William J. FitzPatrick: Unwitting Wrongdoing, Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness2. Matthew Talbert: Akrasia, Awareness, and Blameworthiness3. Maria Alvarez and Clayton Littlejohn: When Ignorance is No Excuse4. Elinor Mason and Alan T. Wilson: Vice, Blameworthiness, and Cultural Ignorance5. George Sher: Blame and Moral Ignorance6. Elizabeth Harman: When Is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?7. Paulina Sliwa: On Knowing What's Right and Being Responsible For It8. Gunnar Bjornsson: Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility9. Peter A. Graham: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Blameworthiness, A Theoretical Epiphenomenon10. Gwen Bradford: Hard to Know11. Alexander A. Guerrero: Intellectual Difficulty and Moral Responsibility12. Michael J. Zimmerman: Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will13. Randolph Clarke: Ignorance, Revision, and Commonsense14. Neil Levy: Methodological Conservatism and the Epistemic Condition15. Matt King: Tracing the Epistemic Condition16. Jan Willem Wieland and Philip Robichaud: Blame Transfer