Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz: Volume II: Information and Economic Analysis: Applications to Capital, Labor, and Product Markets by Joseph E. StiglitzSelected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz: Volume II: Information and Economic Analysis: Applications to Capital, Labor, and Product Markets by Joseph E. Stiglitz

Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz: Volume II: Information and Economic Analysis: Applications to…

byJoseph E. Stiglitz

Hardcover | March 6, 2013

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This is the second of six volumes in a series of selected scientific papers by one of the world's most distinguished economists. Volume I presented the basic concepts in the Economics of Information, showing that markets in which information was imperfect or asymmetric (where some individualsknow things that others don't) behave markedly different from how they would if information were perfect. Volume II, with papers written between 1969 and 2009, explores the implications of the New Information Paradigm for labor, capital, and product markets. This New Paradigm, for which Stiglitzwas awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2001, has fundamentally changed the way we think about every aspect of economics, raising new questions on corporate governance, and leading us to reconsider old questions on corporate finance, the relationship between finance and the economy, andthe theory of economic incentives. While this volume focuses on the application of basic principles, it also extends the theory in important ways, showing the fruitfulness of Stiglitz's research strategy. In doing so, the papers set the ground for questioning some prevailing doctrines: key market phenomena cannot be explained bymarkets with rational expectations, even when information is imperfect. It demonstrates that how societies organize the obtainment, processing, and transmitting of information is as important as how they organize the production and distribution of goods. Indeed, the two issues are inseparable. Thepapers thus lay the foundations of a New Institutional Economics, not only describing how institutions (like sharecropping or banks) work and affect resource allocations, but why they arise and take on particular forms.
Joseph E. Stiglitz is the winner of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, and a lead author of the 1995 report of the IPCC, which shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. He was chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton and chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank for 1997-2000. Prior ...
Title:Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz: Volume II: Information and Economic Analysis: Applications to…Format:HardcoverDimensions:920 pagesPublished:March 6, 2013Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199533717

ISBN - 13:9780199533718

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Table of Contents

Preface to Volume III: Surveys and PerspectivesIntroduction1. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective2. Information and CompetitionII: Capital MarketsIIA: Information and Capital MarketsIntroduction3. Information and Capital Markets4. Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading5. Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital Markets6. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale7. A Simple Proof that Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Imperfect, with I. GaleIIB: Credit and Equity RationingIntroduction8. Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss9. Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss10. Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. HellmannIIC: Structure and Functioning of Capital MarketsIntroduction11. Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald12. Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss13. Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment14. Short-term Contracts as a Monitoring Device, with P. Rey15. Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz16. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, with A. EdlinIII: Information and Labor Markets and the General Theory of IncentivesIIIA: IncentivesIntroduction17. A Survey of the Economics of Incentives18. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy19. Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff20. Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-SharingIIIB: Efficiency WagesIntroduction21. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: The Labor Turnover Model22. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model23. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device, with B. Nalebuff and A. RodriguezIIIC: Wage Distributions, Search, and the Efficiency of Market EquilibriumIntroduction24. Equilibrium Wage Distribution25. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure and Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. ArnottIV. The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard and InsuranceIntroduction26. Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard27. Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets, with R. Arnott28. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, with Moral Hazard with R. ArnottV. Information and Product MarketsIntroduction29. Imperfect Information in Product Markets30. The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop31. Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information32. Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?