Self-Knowing Agents

Paperback | August 1, 2010

byLucy Obrien

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Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second,what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.

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Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second,what account can we give of our knowledge of...

Lucy O'Brien is a Reader in Philosophy at University College London.
Format:PaperbackDimensions:256 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 0.01 inPublished:August 1, 2010Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199592047

ISBN - 13:9780199592043

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Table of Contents

PrefacePart I.1. Introduction2. Arguments for the No-Reference View of 'I'3. Perceptual Models of First Person Reference4. The Self-Reference Rule5. The Agency Account6. Agent's Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental ActionsPart II7. Introduction8. What are Actions?9. On Knowing One's Own Physical Actions10. Bodily Awareness11. Bodily Awareness and Self-Knowledge

Editorial Reviews

"In Self-Knowing Agents Lucy O'Brien accounts for some of the most perplexing features of first-personal self-knowledge by appealing to our awareness of ourselves as agents of mental and physical acts. This is difficult territory, as likely to lead one to hand-waving generalities as toforest-blind technicalities. O'Brien negotiates it excellently, providing a theory that is both well situated in historical debates and well motivated by the sorts of things we care about. This book will be must reading for those interested in the sort of privileged access marked by the 'essentialindexical' as well as for those interested in non-Cartesian views that allow a sort of privileged access to bodily actions. I can also see it being of interest to anyone interested in action theory, epistemology and philosophy of mind in general." --Robert J. Howell, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews