Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together by Michael E. BratmanShared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together by Michael E. Bratman

Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

byMichael E. Bratman

Paperback | January 14, 2014

Pricing and Purchase Info

$18.75 online 
$37.50 list price save 50%
Earn 94 plum® points

Ships within 1-3 weeks

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores


Human beings act together in characteristic ways, and these forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal. Think of friendship and love, singing duets, dancing together, and the joys of conversation. And think about the usefulness of conversation and how we frequently manage to worktogether to achieve complex goals, from building buildings to putting on plays to establishing important results in the sciences.With Shared Agency, Michael E. Bratman seeks to answer questions about the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of our sociality and to establish a framework for understanding basic forms of sociality. Bratman proposes that a rich account of individual planning agency facilitates thestep to these forms of sociality.There is an independent reason - grounded in the diachronic organization of our temporally extended agency - to see planning structures as basic to our individual agency. Once these planning structures are on board, we can expect them to play central roles in our sociality. This planning theory ofindividual agency highlights distinctive roles and norms of intentions, understood as plan states. In Shared Agency Bratman argues that appeals to these planning structures enable us to provide adequate resources for an account of sufficient conditions for these basic forms of sociality. Sharedagency emerges, both functionally and rationally, from structures of interconnected planning agency.
Michael E. Bratman has been at Stanford University since 1974. He is currently U.G. and Abbie Birch Durfee Professor in the School of Humanities and Science and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford. His major book publications are Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987), Faces of Intention (1999), and Structures of Agency (2007). ...
Title:Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting TogetherFormat:PaperbackDimensions:240 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.68 inPublished:January 14, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199339996

ISBN - 13:9780199339990

Look for similar items by category:


Table of Contents

1. Sociality and Planning Agency1. Modest sociality and the continuity thesis2. Shared intention, individual intention3. I intend that we J: a first pass4. Individual planning agency: roles and norms5. Individual planning agency: further ideas6. Creature construction7. Social functioning and social rationality8. Constructivism about shared intention and modest sociality9. Continuity, sufficiency, and Ockham's Razor10. Deception, coercion, shared intentional, shared cooperative2. Building Blocks, Part One1. I intend that we J, and circularity2. Interlocking and reflexive intentions3. Intended mesh4. Intending, expecting, and a disposition to help5. Out in the open3. Building Blocks, Part Two1. I intend that we J, and the own-action condition2. The settle condition, and persistence interdependence3. Persistence interdependence and over-determination4. Three forms of persistence interdependence5. Persistence interdependence, etiology and temporal asymmetry6. Further building blocks7. The connection condition and mutual responsiveness8. Taking stock4. A Construction of Modest Sociality1. The basic thesis2. The emergence of modest sociality3. Modest sociality and strategic interaction4. Quasi-Lockean social ties5. Social networks6. Treating as a means?7. Deception and coercion re-visited8. The compressed basic thesis9. Too demanding?5. Modest Sociality and Mutual Obligation1. Shared intention, social explanation2. Shared intention, persistence interdependence, and mutual obligation3. Gilbert on joint commitment4. Normativity, sociality, and Ockham's Razor6. Group Agents Without Group Subjects1. Group agents and the basic thesis2. Group subjects?7. Shared Deliberation, Common Ground1. Shared deliberation and shared intention2. Shared commitments to weights3. Shared policies about weights4. Where the group stands5. Interdependence in policies about weights6. Partiality and depth of shared policies about weights7. Shared policy-structured acceptance8. Shared policies of social rationalityConclusion: Interconnected Planning AgentsIndex