Social Insurance, Informality, and Labour Markets: How to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs

Hardcover | January 4, 2015

EditorMarkus Frolich, David Kaplan, Carmen Pages

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Most countries implement social protection programs to help individuals manage risks such as unemployment, disability, illness, longevity or death. In many middle income countries, these are often based on a "Bismarckian model" (named after Otto von Bismarck), where benefits are financed bycontributions levied on salaried employment. In countries with a large informal sector, however, only a fraction of the population is covered by this system and non-contributory programs have been added or are planned to increase coverage. This can create distortions in the labor market, and thebook is about policies to expand the coverage of social insurance programs to all workers, without reducing incentives to job creation and formal work.While few would argue against the need and social merits of social insurance and social assistance programs there are growing concerns about their unintended consequences on labor markets because of poor design. The programs can distort incentives and individual behaviors in ways that either reduceemployment levels and/or promote informality, ultimately affecting productivity and economic performance. For instance, high social security contribution rates can reduce formal employment; badly designed unemployment benefits can reduce incentives to keep, search, and take jobs; and fragmentedsocial assistance programs can become a tax on formal labor and encourage informality.The book reviews the evidence regarding the effects of social insurance and social assistance programs on labor market outcomes and discusses options to improve their design and implementation. The book focuses particularly on middle income countries in Latin America and Asia with a large informalsector and suggests ways to reduce these distortions and better manage and finance the subsidies to make coverage universal, while creating good jobs. The book compiles expert papers from the joint conferences of the World Bank (WB), the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) and the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (IDB) on Employment and Development.

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Most countries implement social protection programs to help individuals manage risks such as unemployment, disability, illness, longevity or death. In many middle income countries, these are often based on a "Bismarckian model" (named after Otto von Bismarck), where benefits are financed bycontributions levied on salaried employment. I...

Markus Frolich is Full Professor of Econometrics at the University of Mannheim and former Program Director of the IZA/World Bank research area "Employment and Development". His main research areas are labor market policies, unemployment, social protection, microfinance and econometric policy evaluation in Africa and Asia. He received ...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:384 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 0.1 inPublished:January 4, 2015Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199685231

ISBN - 13:9780199685233

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Table of Contents

Markus Frolich, David Kaplan, Carmen Pages, Jamele Rigolini, David Robalino: Overview and Policy ImplicationsPart I: Social Insurance, Behaviors, and Labor Markets1. Santiago Levy and David Kaplan: Evolution of Social Security Systems in Latin America, and Implications for Labor Markets2. Mariano Bosch, Ana Belen Cobacho, and Carmen Pages: Effects of Non-Contributory Systems on Informality: Taking Stock of Eight Years of Implementation of Mexico's Seguro Popular3. Lucas Navarro, David Margolis, and David Robalino: Unemployment Insurance, Job Search, and Informal Employment4. Marcelo Bergolo, and Guillermo Cruces: Social Insurance Bundles and Formal Employment5. Orazio Attanasio and Costas Meghir: Non-contributory Pensions and Informality in ChilePart II: Defining the Mandate of Social Insurance Programs6. Robert Holzmann: How Much Savings or Insurance? The Role of Information, Knowledge and Psychological Factors in Determining the Mandate of Social Insurance Programs7. Sergi Jimenez-Marin, Alfonso Sanchez Martin, and David Robalino: Inconsistent Time Preferences and Savings: The Case of ChilePart III: Designing Redistributive Arrangements8. Jose Marcio Camargo and Miguel Foguel: Redistributing Income while Reducing Distortions in Labor Markets9. Pablo Acosta, Philip Leite, and Jamele Rigolini: Poverty Impacts of Targeted and Untargeted Programs under Budget Constraints10. Alvaro Forteza: Assessing Implicit Redistribution in Pension Systems within Social Insurance Systems: The Case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and UruguayPart IV: Financing Social Insurance11. Richard Bird and Michael Smart: Financing Instruments, Behaviors, and Labor Market Outcomes12. Robert Gillinghamand Alain Jousten: Reducing the Tax-Wedge in Latin American Countries13. Arturo Anton-Sarabia and Fausto Hernandez: Financing Health Insurance and Pensions through VAT