Strategic Learning and its Limits

Hardcover | May 2, 2005

byH. Peyton Young

not yet rated|write a review
In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regretlearning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game anda given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence. In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners.

Pricing and Purchase Info

$71.50

Ships within 1-3 weeks
Ships free on orders over $25

From the Publisher

In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regretlearning; prediction, postdiction, and calibr...

H. Peyton Young is Senior Fellow in Economic Studies and Governance Studies and Co-Director of the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution. He is also Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and a Member of the Science Steering Committee at the Santa Fe Institute. His main...

other books by H. Peyton Young

Equity: In Theory and Practice
Equity: In Theory and Practice

Paperback|Aug 27 1995

$84.95

Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutiona...

Paperback|Jan 23 2001

$91.94 online$91.95list price
Format:HardcoverDimensions:176 pages, 8.5 × 5.43 × 0.64 inPublished:May 2, 2005Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199269181

ISBN - 13:9780199269181

Customer Reviews of Strategic Learning and its Limits

Reviews

Extra Content

Table of Contents

1. The Interactive Learning Problem2. Reinforcement and Regret3. Equilibrium4. Conditional No-Regret Learning5. Prediction, Postdiction, and Calibration6. Fictitious Play and Its Variants7. Bayesian Learning8. Hypothesis Testing9. Conclusion